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Chemicals, plastics, precision instruments, and textiles: Conventional industrial products such as these pass in impressive volume from the factories of the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) to the markets of its capitalist Western neighbor, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).1 Since 1963, however, a highly
unorthodox export of a radically different kind has also been
vended by the GDR to the FRG in exchange for Western goods
and "hard" currency. The product? East German political prisoners. The price? Currently, from around $15,000 to $75,000 per
head.
Although shrouded in secrecy by both the Bonn and East Berlin governments, the existence of the intra-German traffic in political prisoners is, as a result of leaks to the Western press, a matter
of common knowledge on both sides of the Elbe River.2 Yet, perhaps out of deference to the sensitivities of both German governments, 3 or perhaps as a result of simple oversight, scant critical
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1. For a statistical survey of the GDR's export-import trade with the FRG, see STAATLICHEN ZENTRALVERWALTUNO FOR STATISTIK, STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH 1979 DER DEUT-

SCHEN DEMOKCRATISCHEN REPUBLIK 23-48 (1979). For a discussion of recent developments
in intra-German trade, see Whetten, Scope, Nature, and Change in Inner-German Relations,
57 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 60, 71-75 (1980-81).
2. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1979, at L5, col. 1. The Bonn Government was initially open
with the press concerning its transactions with the East Germans, but fell silent when it
became "feared that the Communists would break off the arrangement once the facts became
known." Id., Feb. 1, 1966, at A4, col. 4; id., Aug. 22, 1965, at A21, col. 5. On the stream of
leaks that revealed the traffic, see Der Tagesspiegel (W. Berlin), June 22, 1976, at 3, col. 1.
3. Both the West and East German governments are loathe to publicize the arrangements. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in his 1980 State of the Nation Address
made a typically oblique reference to the political prisoners who "with our [West German]
assistance" were permitted to leave the GDR. 13 DEUTSCHLAND ARCHlV 549, at 552 (1980).
Official West German commentaries style the exchanges as "Vorzeitige Entlassung durch
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scrutiny has been trained upon the compatability of the intra-German exchange arrangements with the rules of international law,
particularly those rules to which one or both states have subscribed
in international human rights agreements.4 This Article ventures
an initial foray into that gap.5
At the risk of sacrificing surprise and suspense for clarity's
sake, mention is made here of the structure and thrust of this inves-

tigation. After presenting a short history of the prisoner exchange
arrangements, this Article will analyze their legality: first, under a
series of formal international agreements; and, second, under generally accepted principles of international law. From this analysis
will emerge a two-pronged conclusion: (1) the intra-German exchange arrangements as such probably do not violate international
law; and, (2) although the framework of arrangements itself may

pass juridical inspection, it is anchored upon a bedrock of flagrant
human rights violations. This mooring of an apparently legal operational framework to a bedrock of patent illegalities gives rise to
numerous difficult conceptual, ethical and political problems. As a
possible solution to these problems, an international covenant
against state trafficking in human beings for material and political
concessions will be proposed and discussed near this Article's close.
besondere Bemtlhungen der Bundesregierung" [Premature Release Achieved through the
Special Efforts of the Federal Government]. Der Tagesspiegel (W. Berlin), April 30, 1978, at
3, col. 1. More detailed admissions usually stem from unattributed sources, former West
German officials, and non-governmental participants in the exchanges. For a commentary
sharply critical of the West German Government's refusal to acknowledge the arrangements,
see Raguse, Politische Hiftlinge-ein Tabu? 11 DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV 586, 586-90 (1978);
N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1979, at Al, col. 3; id., Oct. 28, 1979, at L5, col. 1. The reasons for the
shroud of silence are probed in Naimark, Is It True What They're Saying About East Germany? 23 ORBIS 549, at 572 (1979). See also Christian Science Monitor, April 26, 1978, at 6,
col. 4 (noting that the West German press "is attentive to government guidance in such
matters"); Whitney, The Fixer, N.Y. Times, March 20, 1977, § 6 (Magazine) 46, at 50-52;
Chicago Tribune, Nov. 3, 1979, § NI at 10, col. 6.
4. Naimark, supra note 3, at 553, notes that contemporary American scholarship, for
example, has been blind to the entire prisoner brokerage issue.
5.

The best known account of the arrangments, M. MEYER, FREIKAUF -

MENSCHEN-

HANDEL IN DEUTSCHLAND (1978), provides an engaging journalistic treatment of the intraGerman dealings, but does not go to the question of their legality. Other discourses upon the
arrangements tend to contain only casual, conclusory references to the parties' obligations
under international law, if any mention of them at all. See, e.g., Whitney, supra note 3, at
46-54 (perhaps the best English language discussion of the deals and the dealers);
Rheinischer Merkur (Bonn-Bad Godesburg), March 9, 1979, at 2, col. 2; Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 1, 1979, at 10, col. 2.
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I. A
A.

CAPTIVE MARKET

The Barriers To Flight

Take steps this very instant to fence off [our land]...
with barriers, so that not a single soul may pass the line;
that not even a hare can scurry here ...
- Alexander Pushkin, Boris Gudunov
On August 13, 1961, in a dramatic pre-dawn stroke, the Government of the GDR sealed off the passageways leading from East
Berlin and the outlying East German countryside into West Berlin. 6 Erected primarily to stem the ruinous flow of skilled and industrious East Germans through Berlin into the more affluent
West, 7 the crude barriers emplaced around the city's three "imperialist" sectors abruptly transformed westward flight from a safe and
pedestrian matter' into a hazardous and sometimes fatal ordeal.9
TSAR:

6. BUNDESMINISTERIUM FUR GESAMTDEUTSCHE FRAGEN, DIE FLUCHT Aus DER
SOWJETZONE UND DIE SPERRMASSNAHMEN DES KOMMUNISTSCHEN REGIMES VOM 13. AuGUST 1961 IN BERLIN, at 28-51 (1961) [hereinafter cited as DIE FLUCHT]. See generally, J.

ROHLE & G. HOLZWEISSIG, 13 AUG. 1961: DIE MAUER VON BERLIN (1981).
7. "Three out of five [East German] refugees were productive workers; roughly half of
[Iln the years 1954-61 the GDR
them were young people aged less than twenty-five ....
lost nearly 5,000 doctors, dentists and veterinary surgeons, over 800 judges and lawyers,
nearly 17,000 schoolteachers and roughly the same number of qualified engineers and tech[T]he aggregate loss to East Germany from 1945-61 was at least 3.6 million
nicians ....
people, roughly equal to the entire [1970] population of Norway." D. SHEARS, THE UGLY
FRONTIER 43 (1970). See id., 43-46; DIE FLUCHT, supra note 6, at 17; J. Palenberg, Before
the Wall: East German Emigration Law and Policy, 1945-61, at 74-94 (March 22, 1981)
(unpublished M.A.L.D. thesis, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University).
For a description of the economic cleft between the FRG and the GDR in the late 1950s, see
J. DORNBERG, THE OTHER GERMANY 101-03, 106-09 (1968); J. SMITH, GERMANY BEYOND
THE WALL 84-88 (1969). For an account of the sharp upswing in the GDR's fortunes caused
by the errection of the Berlin Wall, see H. PACHTER, MODERN GERMANY: A SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL HISTORY 341-49 (1978).
8. By July, 1958, as many as nine out of ten refugees fled the GDR by way of a casual
walk or train ride to West Berlin. Bericht des Ausschusses ftir Bevolkerungs und Fltchtlingswesen der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates aiber das Problem der Fltichtlinge aus
der sowjetischen Zone Deutschlands, vorgelegt von dem Abg. Selvik (Jan. 19, 1959), reprinted in DOKUMENTE ZUR DEUTSCHLANDPOLITIK, Series 4, 1/1 (1958-1959), at 621-28
(Deuerlein & Nathan, eds. 1971).
9. Conservative Western estimates place the number of East Germans slain between
August 1961 and December 1977 in attempts to cross the GDR-FRG border at 103, with the
total rising to approximately 173 when the fatalities from along the border in Berlin are
added. BUNDESMINISTERIUM FuR INNERDEUTSCHE BEZIEHUNGEN, DDR HANDBUCH 921

(2nd ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as DDR HANDBUCH]. The success of the GDR's deterrents
to emigration can be measured in terms of the number of East German refugees registered
annually in the FRG. In 1960, a total of 199,188 refugees were recorded. In the over seven
months of 1961 preceding the erection of the Berlin Wall, 155,402 refugees were tallied.
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Over an initial period of several months, virtually all East
Germans were refused permission to cross over into non-socialist
Germany.' ° In the two decades since 1961, however, numerous exceptions to the once absolute ban on westward movement have
been created. The role of the GDR's system of frontier controls has
thus been changed from that of a hermetic seal into that of a selectively permeable membrane." A few well-known examples suffice
to illustrate the point.
Stalwart GDR officials, prize athletes, and trusted scientists
have long been able to visit the West under varying degrees of official supervision. 1 2 Since late 1964, elderly East Germans routinely
have been permitted to enjoy periodic stays in West Germany,' 3
possibly because: first, pensioners seldom abandon their benefits
and friends in the GDR for a "fresh start" in the West; second, the
promise of a retirement vacation in the non-socialist lands beyond
the Elbe is an incentive to good behavior during their working
years; and third, the defection of a pensioner saves the state a considerable sum in unpaid pension benefits. 14 Persons of every age
group with close relatives in the FRG have been permitted since
late 1972 to cross into West Germany for urgent family affairs (such
as births, illnesses, and deaths), although the number of such visits
Thereafter, the rate slumped to 51,624 for the remainder of 1961; 16,741 in 1962; 12,967 in
1963; 5,047 in 1970, and a mere 4,031 in 1977. Only 721 individuals successfully fled the
GDR by directly assaulting the GDR-FRG or GDR/East Berlin-West Berlin border in
1977. Id., at 400-01.
10. Id., at 401, 1089.
11. West German records list the number of registered refugees who received authorization to emigrate from the GDR to the FRG as follows:
1963
29,665
1970
12,472
1964

30,012

1971

11,565

1965
1966

12,666
15,675

1972
1973

11,627
8,667

1967
1968

13,188
11,134

1974
1975

7,928
10,274

1969

11,702

1976
10,058
1977
8,041
These totals reflect only those refugees who applied for government aid upon arrival in the
FRG. Id., at 1089.
12. See generally D. SHEARS, supra note 7, at 10, 15.

13. Since November 2, 1964, women over the age of 60 and men over the age of 65 have
been generally allowed to travel into the West for limited periods. DDR HANDBUCH, supra
note 9, at 202. In his 1980 State of the Nation Address, FRG Chancellor Schmidt reported
that 1.4 million East German pensioners visit the FRG annually. 13 DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV
549, 552 (1980). See also Whetten, supra note I, at 69.
14. See J. DORNBERG, supra note 7, at 117-18; M. MEYER, supra note 5, at 10. State-

supported invalids and accident victims enjoy the same travel privileges as normal retirees.
DDR HANDBUCH, supra note 9, at 202.
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was limited to approximately 40,000 in 1979."s Additionally, members of divided families, 6 undesirable social critics, 7 and an odd
assortment of other individuals sporadically have been allowed to
exit across the GDR's western borders.
Yet, despite these exceptions, for most East Germans the
GDR's network of statutory restrictions and border fortifications
presents an almost impassable barrier to westward migration. Persons of working age with no close relatives in the West are rarely
granted the visas required for travel to the FRG and West Berlin. '8
The mere application for a visa can sometimes invite harassment
and loss of employment.' 9 While an estimated 4,000 to 6,000 East
Germans successfully flee the GDR along illegal avenues of escape
each year - occasionally with the aid of professional refugee2 ° and usually via third countries, as opsmugglers (Fluchlhifer)
15. DDR HANDBUCH, supra note 9, at 202-03; 13 DEUTSCHLAND ARCHiv 549, 552
(1980).
16. Roughly 26,000 persons left the GDR under the intra-German "family reunion program" between January 1970 and 1979. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Sept. 22, 1979, at
1, col. 2. Between August 1961 and 1968, the Red Cross resettled 122,000 East Germans into
the FRG as part of the family reunification scheme. J. DORNBERG, supra note 7, at 116. See
also DDR HANDBUCH, supra note 9, at 1089.
17. See N.Y. Times, March 16, 1980, at A8, col. 1; id. Sept. 24, 1977, at Al, col. 1; [1980]
KEESING'S CONTEMP. ARCHvES, 30089-90.
18. An annotated description of the requirements imposed by the GDR's passport laws
may be found in Mampel, Bemerkungen zum Bericht der DDR an das Menschenrechtskomitee
der Vereinigten Nationen 22 RECHT IN OST UND WEST 149, 152 (1978). Generally, a passport and a visa are required, both of which may be withheld by East German authorities
without explanation or appeal.
19. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1979, at AI, col. 3. Despite the possibility of official retaliation,
an estimated 120,000 emigration applications flooded in on East German officials in the
wake of the publicity surrounding the GDR's unqualified endorsement of the Final Act of
the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [Helsinki Accord]. See infra
notes 127-29. Only after the East German government warned the populace to desist did the
torrent of applications subside. See Croan, New Country, OldNationality, 37 FOREIGN POLIcY 142, 148-49 (1979-80); Houston Chronicle, Nov. 6, 1976, at D2, col. 5; New York Times,
Oct. 11, 1977, at A14, col. 4; Heneghan, Human Rights Protests In EasternEurope, 33 THE
WORLD TODAY 90, 97 (1977).
20. Villified by East German commentators as "Menschenhilndler" (man-traffickers) but
condoned by the FRG, refugee-smugglers have been the focus of a long, bitter dispute between Bonn and East Berlin. See generally Klose, Kriminallsierbarkeit der Fluchthife, 9
ZEITsCHRiFr FOR RECHTSPOLiTIK 28-32 (1976); Schroeder, Die Krirninalisierwg der
Fluchthilfe ist unuldssig,id., at 32-34; J. DORNBERG, supra note 7, at 111-14; Heimeshoff, Die
Schutzpflicht der Bundesrepublik gegenfiber Fluchthelfern, 1975 DEUTSCHE RICHTERZEITUNG
111-12; 0. KIMMINICH, FLUCHTILFE UND FLUCHT Aus DER DDR IN DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (1974); Watnsche, Vl/lkerrechtlicheAspekte der Verletzng internationaler
Abkommen durch die ndtgkeit von Menschenhindlerorganisationen,1976 N.J. 696-700. A
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posed to directly across the heavily policed intra-German borders2"
they make their attempts at considerable risk to life, limb and
liberty.22
Severe criminal penalties are visited upon apprehended
would-be refugees. Persons convicted of planning, attempting, or
accomplishing an unauthorized border-crossing face imprisonment
of up to eight years in serious cases, 23 with a possible sentence of up
to five additional years if they avail themselves of the services of a
Western refugee-smuggler. 24 The hazards of flight preparation are
magnified by a law which requires all persons who possess reliable
information concerning a prospective illegal departure of a serious
type to report their suspicions to public authorities immediately.25
More forbidding than the statutory deterrents, however, is the increasingly elaborate, brutal, and effective latticework of border fortifications strewn around the GDR. 26 According to a 1979 West
German Ministry of the Interior account, along the 1346 kilometer
(835 mile) East-West German border alone, there were an estimated 1,211 kilometers of metal rail fencing wired to electronic se1961 decision by the GDR's highest court flatly labelled German refugee-smuggling a violation of international law. Urteil des Obersten Gerichts vom 2. August 1961 -1 Zst (1) 2/61
- gegen Adamo und andere, 1961 N.J. 550, 551. See also Steiniger and Reintanz, Menscenhandel- Verbrechen im Sinne des Viilkerrechis, 1961 N.J. 556-61.
21. See infra notes 26-27. Only about ten per cent of the East German refugees registered by the FRG reportedly brave the GDR's frontier barriers directly. Volkmer, East Germany.- Dissenting Views during the Last Decade, in OPPOSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE 120 (R.
Tok~s ed. 1979). See also L.A. Times, March 23, 1979, at A6, col. 3.
22. See Nawrocki, Grenzverletzer"vernichten". Wie man DDR-Bfirger am Verlassen
thres Staates hindert, Die Zeit, Aug. 13, 1976, at A9, col. 1. A Berlin Wall necrology is
provided by Finn, Die Opfer der Mauer, 14 DEUTSCHLAND ARCHiv 790-95 (1981).
23. STGB.DDR § 2-3 (1980). Serious cases (schwereFallen) are defined as those which
involve damAge to border security equipment, the possession of tools with which to inflict
such damage, the possession of weapons, the application of dangerous methods, the use of
false documents, concealment, group action, recidivism, or special intensity (besondereIntensitt) in the deed. Non-serious cases (which are obviously few) are punishable by imprisonment of up to two years, conviction with a suspended sentence, or a fine of up to 100,000
marks. Remarks upon the 1979 sharpening of these provisions may be found in Schroeder,
Die Neue Strafrechtsreformder DDR, 12 DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV 1064, 1072 (1979); Lainrich, Das politische Strafrecht in der DDR und den anderen sozialistischen Landern, 13
DEUTSCHLAND ARCHLY 843, 845-48 (1980); Palenberg, Disquiet on the Western Front, 5
FLETCHER FORUM 351-61 (1981).

24. STGB.DDR § 225 (1980).
25. STGB.DDR § 100 (1980). The sanctions for non-compliance with the Anmeldepflicht (duty to report) are imprisonment for up to five years, conviction with a suspended
sentence, a fine of up to 100,000 marks, or public denunciation.
26. For thorough descriptions of the "modem frontier" fortifications, see D. SHEARS,
supra note 7, at 70-87; N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1978, at 138; id., July 20, 1980, at A3, col. 4;
Chicago Tribune, Sept. 24, 1978, at A10, col 1; L.A. Times, March 23, 1979, at A6, col. 3.
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curity systems, 1,211 kilometers of double barbed wire barricades,
790 kilometers of vehicle traps, 96 kilometers policed by dogs, 625
observation towers, 34,800 automatic firing devices operated by trip
wires and other triggers, and 366 kilometers of minefield containing
as many as 1,000,000 mines.2 7
Supplementing these disheartening obstacles, East German
border patrolmen are under order to shoot anyone who breaches
border security.28 Official West German estimates conservatively
place the number of East Germans slain in escape attempts along
the FRG-GDR border at 103, with an additional 70 fatalities registered on West Berlin's perimeter. 29 East German refugees in the
FRG speculate that for each illicit border crossing that succeeds,
eight or ten fail.30 Even if unduly pessimistic, this estimate comports with reports that over half of the political prisoners in the
GDR have been imprisoned on account of attempted
Republikflucht31
27. L.A. Times, March 23, 1979, at A6, col. 3. A recent report described, in reverse
order, some of the obstacles which a refugee must overcome in stealing across the FRGGDR border
The 9-foot-high fence is a mesh of razor-sharp metal triangles, just big enough that
a person can get his fingers in for a handhold. The fencing hangs loosely from
cement posts sunk three feet into the ground and set five feet apart. It is not electrified. . . . Two antipersonnel mines are strapped on [the] east side of each post, one
at hand level, one at knee level. They are aimed parallel to the fencing. They are
armed with a quarter pound of TNT and a half pound of buckshot. It takes a
quarter-ounce of pressure on the fence to set them off. If one facing south is
tripped, then one facing north goes off, catching anything between in a crossfire. . . . East of the fencing are a few yards of cleared and plowed earth, raked
smooth to show any footprints. A few yards behind is a 5-foot-wide vehicular ditch
with concrete slabs. A few yards beyond is a concrete runway for East German
border guards, their vehicles, and their dogs. . . . Beyond the runway is more
plowed and raked earth, then open fields. Finally, 500 yards from the first fence is
another fence . . . and it is said to be electrified. Every half-mile along the trace
the East Germans have [concrete guardtowers] ....
Chicago Tribune, Sept. 24, 1978, at AI0, col. 1.
28. Directives familiar to Western observers instruct East German patrols to issue a
verbal warning before firing on border trespassers. Still secret directives, however, evidently
order the patrols to disregard formalities if necessary to prevent an escape. See DDR
HANDBUCH, supra note 9, at 922. For a somewhat dated account, see Grflnwald, Ist der
Schusswaffengebrauch an der Zonengrenze slrabar? 1966 JURISTENZEITUNG 638, 638-39. See
also The Times (London), Jan. 22, 1981, at 14, col. 3 (fleeing woman reported slain).
29. DDR HANDBUCH, supra note 9, at 922.
30. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1979, at Al, col. 3.
31. Id, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1977, at A3, col. 3; L.A. Times, Nov. 28, 1979, § VI, 1, col.
1; Raguse, supra note 3, at 588. See also Der Tagespiegel (W. Berlin), April 30, 1978, at 3,
col. 1 (relating estimates that placed the GDR's pre-1979-amnesty political prisoner count at
between 4,000 and 6,000). As many as 40,000 East Germans have been convicted of Republikflucht since the 1961 border closure, according to one West German source. Chicago
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B. A Crack in the Wall
Ironically one of the reputedly least perilous routes to the West
to become known in recent years, leads would-be East German
emigrants directly through the prison cells of the GDR. Since
1963, the West German Government has funneled over $500 million worth of prized Western merchandize and currency to the
GDR in exchange for the release of over 16,400 political prisoners
into the West.3 2 Bringing approximately 1,200 persons routinely
and safely across the border each year, the exchanges have reportedly inspired many East Germans to consider them as an avenue of
escape.33 One East German emigr6 described their scheme in this
manner:
If someone wants to get out these days, he may just begin speaking his min..... That's good enough to get you in jail quickly.
You're betting that the West Germans will buy you and you're
not running the risk of being shot to death. It's a very brutal
gamble, but I know that there are people now who have thought
the situation over and are acting accordingly.3 4
Writing in Orbis, Norman Naimark detailed the attractions of
voluntary incarceration:
Word has spread quickly among dissatisfied circles of East German society that the former political internees are treated well by
the West German government. Not only are they eligible immediately for government-supported housing and social and medical services, but, in contrast to the illegal refugee, they receive
cash payments in the form of a Haftentschidigung ("compensation for false arrest"). According to the Constitution of the Federal Republic, West German law applies to East Germany; if
East German citizens are imprisoned for breaking laws not on
the books of the West German criminal code, they are eligible
for the same compensation for false imprisonment that applies in
the West. In addition, by being bought out of prison, the East
Tribune, Jan. 14, 1978, at 8, col. 6. It should be noted that the GDR denies that it at present
holds any political prisoners. Interview with Erich Honecker, Feb. 6, 1981, 14 DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV 318, 325 (1981).
32. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1980, at A8, col 1; Frankfurther Aligemeine Zeitung, Nov.
1, 1979, at 10, col. 2. The West German government reputedly budgeted around 84 million
marks for the exchanges in 1978, 91 million in 1979, and 100 million marks in 1980. Id.
33. See M. MEYER, supra note 5, at 187; Chicago Tribune, Nov. 3, 1979, at A10, col. 6;
N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1979, at L5, col. 1; GEslcr ZuR WAND: PROTOKOLLE POLITSCHE
HAF'LINGE DER DDR 21 (J. Lolland and F. Rddiger ed. 1977); Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, Nov. 1, 1979, at 10, col. 2; Naimark, supra note 3, at 574; L.A. Times, Nov. 28, 1979,
§ VI, 1, col. 1; Raguse, supra note 3, at 588.
34. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1979, at L5, col. 1.
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German "refuseniks" legally exit from the GDR. They can legally use the transit autobahns, theoretically can visit in the East
(for those under age 65, this is still theory), and can hope for
reunification with their GDR families in the West. On the other
hand, illegal escapees are still criminals in the East, dare not use
the transit autobahns, receive no lump-sum payments from the
West, and - most difficult of all - arrive in the West with a
debt (usually some 15,000-20,000 marks per head) to the organizations that arranged their escapes. Their families in the East
are harassed more severely than those of the released political
prisoners; they can maintain little hope of ever seeing their families again.3 5

Thus, for persons intent upon migration to the West, and especially
for those with neither the means to hire professional refugee smugglers nor the cunning to plot their own sensible escapes, the route
through the prisons may be the most reasonable choice. This
choice is not, however, risk-free. In the absence of a Western friend
to champion his cause, a political prisoner may be overlooked by
the Bonn Government. The East Berlin Government may intentionally decline to offer him for trade. 36 The GDR's leadership
may decide, as it did in 1979, to declare a general amnesty,3 7
thereby turning the luckless political prisoner onto the streets with a
police record, no egress to the West, and the prospect of a minimum sentence of three years if he commits another political
35.
36.
panying
37.

Naimark, supra note 3, at 574-75.
The method by which prisoners are selected for exchange is discussed infra accomnotes 57-59.
General amnesties recur periodically in the GDR. See A BIS Z: EIN TASCHEN-

UND NACHSCHLAGSBUCH tIBER DEN ANDEREN TElL DEUTSCHLANDS 24-25 (1 th ed. 1969);

DDR HANDBUCH, supra note 9, at 40. In the 1979 amnesty, 21,928 prisoners were released,
and tens of thousands of prison sentences were significantly reduced. See Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 1, 1979, at 10, col 2; id. Dec. 18, 1979, at 6, col. 5; Frankfurter
Rundschau, Sept. 28, 1979, at 8; Fricke, Bilanz der DDR-Amnestie '79, 13 DEUTSCHLAND
ARCHLY 127 (1980). Of the individuals released approximately 1,500 could be properly designated as "political prisoners," according to a West German group interested in refugee
affairs. Fricke, supra, at 128. Unlike the general amnesty of 1972, which involved the immediate release to the West of over 2,087 of the 25,000 discharged prisoners, the 1979 amnesty
permitted only four East German prisoners to cross the border. A report in the Frankfurter
Ailgemeine Zeftwg observed that the GDR's decision to retain the freed prisoners was intended "to check the spreading opinion in the GDR that if one wants to go to the West, one
only has to commit some criminal deed which will not be punished too harshly - e.g., being
caught while preparing to flee - and sit in prison for awhile in order ultimately to be
shipped to the West .... Many people who flee and become subject to punishment in the
GDR are speculating upon being bought free in the near future. Obviously such speculations are to be ended." Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 1, 1979, at 10, col. 2.
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crime.38 Finally, as briefly occured in 31972
and again in 1979, the
9

exchanges could simply be broken off.
Mutual advantage, however, gives both German governments
good reason to continue the transactions. For the GDR, the exchange arrangement brings in badly needed Western goods at little
immediate effort or expense,' relieves troublesome crowding in
state prisons, 4 1 spares the national treasury the expense of incarcerating malcontents, flushes undesirable misfits out of the country,
helps protect the GDR from harangues over the imprisonment of
dissidents, provides a simple means of filtering spies into the West

and pleases influential politicians in Bonn.
West German leaders view the arrangement with favor because, among other things, it sometimes delivers experienced German white and blue-collar workers at modest prices 42 and supplies
a ready source of information on East German prison and social
conditions. In addition, it enables West Germany to assure its
agents that it will be able to fish them out of captivity if they are
snared, and provides the Bonn Government with the satisfaction of
both serving humanitarian ends and exercising its constitutionally
43
assigned role as Schutzpatron of all Germans.
38. STGB.DDR § 44(2)(F) (1980).
39. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1979, at L5, col. 1; Frankfurter 411gemeine Zeitung, Oct. 29,
1979, at 1, col. i; L.A. Times, Nov. 28, 1979, § VI, 1, col. 1. In 1972, the exchanges were
temporarily halted by West Germany for reasons associated with its national elections of that
year. M. MEYER, supra note 5, at 197 n.2. The New York Times reported that exchanges
were also interrupted by Bonn in 1966 because of the "danger that the Communists might
attempt to arrest Westerners deliberately in hopes of obtaining payment for their release."
N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1966, at A4, col. 4.
40. See Naimark, supra note 3, at 558; Croan, supra note 19, at 155-58.
41. Raguse, supra note 3, at 587, speculates that the GDR's general amnesties are necessary to relieve over-crowding in East German prisons. To the extent that people place themselves in prison in the hope of being purchased out, this particular advantage is erased. See
also Der Tagesspiegel (W. Berlin), April 30, 1978, at 3, col. 1.
42. The prices are reasonable in that the benefits which an experienced worker is likely
to confer upon West German society over the course of his career will probably far outweigh
the costs of bringing him out of the GDR and reorientating him. The persons purchased out
tend to be young and able. Of the three hundred prisoners released into the FRG between
October 1976 and December 1976, for example, roughly 167 (55.7%) were from 18 through
27 years old, 99 (33.0%) from 28 through 37, with the remaining 34 (11.3%) over 38. Arranged by profession, there were 202 laborers and craftsmen (67.3%), 49 academicians
(16.3%), 22 white collar workers (7.3%), 15 students (5.0%), 6 agrarian workers (2.0%), 4
artists (1.3%), I independent entrepreneur (0.3%), and 1 pensioner (0.3%). [Percentages
rounded off to the nearest tenth of a per cent.] GESICHT ZUR WAND, supra note 33, at 23-24.
See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1975, at Al, col. I (release of physicians reported).
43. In its Judgment of July 31, 1973, the West German Federal Constitutional Court, in
ruling on the constitutionality of the Basic Treaty of 1972 between the FRG and the GDR,
proclaimed:
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Despite the advantages which the exchanges yield both East
Berlin and Bonn, neither government, for understandable reasons,
has been happy to see them publicized."4 From the GDR's perspective, the practice of routinely surrendering wayward citizens
into the hands of "fascist monopoly capitalists" is difficult to reconcile with conventional Marxist rhetoric and ideology, even if fresh
produce and consumer wares are received in return. The theoretical inconsistencies inherent in the trade manifest themselves in
practical problems. East German security forces, for instance,
probably would not be inspired to greater zeal in their duties by the
recognition that the severe penalties meted out for crimes against
the state are within months commonly converted into one-way tickets to West Germany; a place envisioned by many as a "chromeplated neon-lighted Shangri-La."45 From the FRG's perspective,
the reasons for secrecy are today not as compelling as they were
formerly,46 but the vulnerability of politicians of all three major
parties to attacks from the right for subsidizing the GDR's methods
of political repression and subversion with funds drawn from West
German taxpayers, and the continuing sensitivity of the FRG's
East German trading partners to criticism of the deals, have not
encouraged governmental indiscretion.
Heedless of official desires, sharp condemnations of the prisoner exchange arrangements have intermittently appeared in the
Western press, especially in conservative and Communist publications.47 Peppered with references to international compacts, invo[Within the Basic Law's realm of effect, [the Federal Government] - through all
its diplomatic missions and in all the international fora in which it is a participant
- is to raise its voice, to make its influence felt, to step in for the interest of the
[German] nation, for the protection of Germans in the sense of Article 116, Paragraph I of the Basic Law. . .even for every individual [German] who turns with a
plea for meaningful support in the defense of his rights, particularly his constitutional rights. [Translation by this author.]
Judgment of July 31, 1973 - 2 BvF 1/73 - (BVerfGE 36, 1), quoted in Heimeshoff, Die
Schutzpflichf der Bundesrepublikgegenftber ?Tuchiheifern, 1975 DEUTSCHE RICHTERZEITUNG
111, 112. See also 22 RECHT IN OST UND WEST 279-80 (1978).

44. See supra note 3.
45. The colorful metaphor is from J. DORNBERG, supra note 7, at 122.
46. As a condition of exchange, the GDR demanded absolute secrecy of the FRG. See
infra notes 3 & 51.
47. See, e.g., Rheinischer Merkur (Bonn-Bad Godesburg), Mar. 9, 1979, at 2, col. 2;
Bayernkurier (Munich), Aug. 12, 1978, at 3; Bianco y Negro (Madrid), May 8, 1979; La
Republica (San Jos6, Costa Rica), Oct. 9, 1975, at E5,col. 1. But see M. MEYER, supra note
5,passim (supporting the exchanges on humanitarian grounds); Pond, Trade in Humans Divulged, Christian Science Monitor, April 26, 1978, at 6, col. 4 (denying exchanges are mod-
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cations of international law, and frequently, legal terminology,
these condemnations commonly chastize the GDR for engaging in
slavery,"' kidnapping for ransom, 49 or gross violations of human

dignity (e.g., "brokerage in human flesh").5 0 The GDR responded
to these allegations in 1979 by declaring an end to the arrangements." Although the East Germans offered no explanation for
their unilateral decision, one Western observer noted:
Decisive [to the announced termination].

. .

is concern over the

international reputation of the GDR. The East Berlin regime
perceives that world-wide the finger of accusation
is pointed at it:
52
You traffic in men for filthy mammon.
In March 1980, the GDR, without explanation or ceremony,
resumed its exchanges with the FRG.5 3 The most highly publicized
transaction since then involved the delivery of approximately 3,000
East German nationals to West Germany in exchange for an undisclosed payment, as well as a spy swap featuring Guenther Guillaume, the former assistant to ex-West German Chancellor Willy
em. white slave trade). See also Weltwoche (Zurich), March 15, 1978, at 23. See generally
N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1979, at L5, col. 1; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Jan. 10, 1979, at 4,
col I.
48. See, e.g., Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Jan. 10, 1979, at 4, col. 1 (condemnation
of the deals as "modern slave trade" by Erich Mende, former West German Minister of
Intra-German Affairs and a co-originator of them); L.A. Times, Nov. 28, 1979, at § VI, 1, col.
1 (quoting a British spokesman at the U.N. Human Rights Commission who criticized the
GDR for "carrying out a 20th century slave trade"). See also M. KRIELE, DIE MENSCHENRECHTE ZWISCHEN OST UND WEST 33 (1977); M. MEYER, supra note 5, at 214; Washington
Post, May 19, 1978, at CI, col. 2.
49. Eg., La Republica (San Jose, Costa Rica), Oct. 9, 1975, at E5, col. 1:
All civilized peoples conemn kidnapping not because of the sums that have to be
paid to ransom an individual, but because the human being regardless of the price
is transformed into a piece of merchandise ....
The East German government's
immorality has reached such a point that it has included these sales [of persons
kidnapped by the communist regime] in trade agreements ....
It appears that
cynicism has become the greatest norm of international law.
50. See Whitney, supra note 3, at 46, col. I.
51. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1979, at L5, col. 1; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 29,
1979, at Al, col. 1; Washington Post, May 19, 1978, at Cl, col. 2. Wolfgang Vogel (see infra
note 56) had warned in 1978, "[The exchanges] could come to an end if the German Democratic Republic has the feeling that the exchange is being taken advantage of and exploited
by Western propaganda against the East." Quoted in id. In an interview with the West
Berlin newspaper DerAbend, Vogel reportedly said, "I see very black clouds on the horizon
since it has become fashionable to reduce true help to material for the market in scandals
and gossip." Quoted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 1, 1979, at AI0, col 2. See
also M. MEYER, supra note 5, at 219; Whitney, supra note 3, at 54.
52. Engert, DDR stoppt den Freikauf,Deutsche Zeitung, Oct. 26, 1979, quotedin Fricke,
supra note 37, at 129.
53. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1980, at A8, col. 1.
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Brandt. 54 Before moving on to consider whether the intra-German
exchange arrangements constitute a violation of international law,
a few additional remarks on their history and method of operation
are appropriate.
C

Anomaly Wrapped In Enigma

The sensational exchange of Soviet master spy Col. Rudolf
Abel for downed American U-2 pilot Francis Gary Power in February 1962, inspired hopes among some Western politicians that
something could also be done to bring relief to the thousands of
political internees sitting in Communist prisons. At Western request, Ju.rgen Stange, a West Berlin lawyer, approached Wolfgang
Vogel, a well-connected East Berlin lawyer who had represented
Col. Abel in his exchange negotiations, and began to sound out
possibilities. In late 1962, through the good offices of West Berlin
publisher Axel Springer, Stange and Vogel presented the Bonn
Government with a remarkable proposal: at a standard charge of
40,000 West German marks per person, the East German Government was willing to begin a large-scale secret release of political
prisoners. Skeptical at first, the West Germans delayed acceptance
of the offer until after a trial exchange had been successfully completed in 1963." Once the good faith and ability of Stange, Vogel,
and their East German contacts was established, the transactions in
1964 assumed 6the form and scale that they in many respects still
exhibit today.1
The method by which prisoners are selected for release is relatively simple: two lists - one drawn up in Bonn from names suggested by churches, charitable organizations, government offices,
54. Boston Globe, Oct. 3, 1981, at 3, col. 5; Deutschland Nachrichten (New York), Oct.
7, 1981, at 4.

55. On the platform of the Friedrichstrasse, an elevated railway station in East Berlin,
eight political prisoners filed one-by-one into the West as a representative of the Evangelical
Church of Germany (an organization accustomed to moving money into East Germany
along covert channels) slipped eight bundles, containing a total of 360,000 West German
marks, to an East German customs agent. Whitney, supra note 3, at 50. For an equally
intriguing, but in many particulars divergent, account of the 1963 exchange, see M. MEYER,
supra note 5, at 34-40.
56. Whitney, supra note 3, at 52. For descriptions of the intriguing Dr. Vogel, see Der
Spiegel, Sept. 1, 1975, at 28-29; id., Oct. 27, 1975; N.Y. Times, May 6, 1978, at C7; Whitney,
upra note 3, at 46-56; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 12, 1976, at A12; Kolner StadtAnzeiger, July 29, 1977, at A3; Rheinischer Merkur (Bonn-Bad Godesburg), Oct. 31, 1975, at
Al0.
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and private individuals;57 the other list prepared by East German
officials authorized to designate prisoners suited for release - are
compared by Stange and Vogel. The persons whose names appear
on both lists are then divided into categories and priced according
to how much damage their departure will inflict upon the GDR.
Thus doctors, whose training expenses absorb a sizable chunk of

state resources, command the highest price (up to $75,000), while a
common laborer may go for as little as $15,000.58 Since both
Stange and Vogel enjoy the confidence of their respective governments, their determinations are reportedly never challenged.59
Because for many years the FRG refused to recognize the
existence, let alone the legitimacy of the GDR, and because the
GDR insisted upon total secrecy in its prisoner dealings, the transfer of assets from the FRG to the GDR initially presented
problems. Bonn steered around these problems by, first, budgeting
its transfer expenditures under vaguely entitled accounts (much as
the budget of the United States' Central Intelligence Agency is prepared);6" second, contributing its payments in the form of agricultural products and industrial goods to churches, the Red Cross, and
other non-profit institutions; and third, permitting the charitable
middlemen to ship the payments into the GDR.61 In this way, the
57. The German Red Cross, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Church
of Germany have been active in supplying names. The Bonn Government has on occasion
solicited names in discrete classified advertisements.
58. See Wash. Post, May 19, 1978, at CI, col. 2; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov.
I, 1979, at Al0, col. 2. The price gradations are theoretially peculiar. It is odd, for instance,
that in a "workers' and peasants' state," the members of the ruling group are assigned the
lowest value in exchange.
59. M. MEYER, supra note 5, at 49.
60. M. MEYER, supra note 5, at 160, cites as examples the rubrics "Training and Education" and "Measures in Connection with Intra-German Relations and the Border Areas."
The title "Special Humanitarian Efforts" is currently used frequently.
61. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1975, at Al, col. 1; id., Dec. 4, 1976, Whitney, supra note 3,
at 46, 52; M. MEYER, supra note 5, at 159-67. But cf. Washington Post, May 18, 1976, at C1,
col. 2 (claiming only a minority of the payments have been made with barter); L.A. Times,
Nov. 28, 1979, § VI, at 1, col. I (stating the GDR receives trade credits for use with West
German industrialists). New York Times correspondent Craig R. Whitney described a typical circle of transactions in these words:
In September 1975, the word from Vogel was that the East German authorities
were willing to release 300 prisoners, their last batch for the year. But the usual rate
. . . would not suffice, since the group contained many doctors it had cost the Govemnment $60,000 a head to train. [West German Minister for Intra-German Affairs]
Franke approved a higher figure and sent a check to Bishop Kunst [of the Evangelical Church of Germany]. That elderly clergyman sent a subordinate to the Ministry of Trade in East Berlin for the Communists' shopping list. Bishop Kunst paid
the bills, the prisoners turned up at the crossing point at Herleshausen, and the food
items on the list turned up shortly in the East Berlin markets off the Alexanderplatz.
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East Germans received products for which they would otherwise
have had to purchase with scarce foreign exchange or forego, and
the West Germans could be sure that their payments were at least
going to benefit the East German people. 62 Butter, citrus fruits,
coffee beans, chemicals, Swedish steel, and boxcars full of other
Western products mysteriously appeared in East German markets

coincident with each prisoner release. Michel Meyer, the French
journalist whose book brought the exchanges to widespread attention, went so far as to suggest:
. . [S]ince the beginning of the 1960s, only thanks to the sale of
many thousands of prisoners could oranges be sold in the shops
of the GDR.6 3
Although the reticence of both Bonn and East Berlin renders
most estimates of the value of the prisoner exchanges somewhat
suspect,' 4 the figures usually offered by fairly reliable sources make
one United States intelligence officer's characterization of the prisoners as "East Germany's best cash crop" seem only modestly overstated. As Meyer pointed out, any sum near the 761 million mark
total which he believed had been paid East Germany from 1964
through 1975 would have played a significant part in offsetting the
GDR's 3,749 million mark intra-German trade deficit over the
same period.65
*

Whitney, supra note 3, at 52.
62. Erich Mende explained:
By the national elections of 1965 we had gotten 4,000 political prisoners out, for 198
million marks' worth of goods - everything from fertilizer, drugs, coffee, radios to
tropical fruit. It was done through church channels and we made sure the people in
East Germany benefited from it. After one of the deals had been made, we'd send
some one to the East Berlin food markets to check on whether, say, a shipment of
oranges had arrived. . . . [We chose barter because] [w]ith cash you wouldn't be
able to tell what happened to the money.
Quoted in Whitney, upra note 3, at 52 [Whitney's comments deleted.]
63. M. MEYER, supra note 5, at 199. Similar but less sweeping statements are in Der
Spiegel, Sept. 1, 1975, at 28; Whitney, supra note 3, at 46.
64. Werner Raguse reported that the following patchwork of estimates had appeared in
Western newspapers over a three year period:
at least 265 million marks in the time from 1969 through August 31, 1974 (Quick,
Jan. 23, 1975), 264 million from 1969 to 1975 (Paris Match, Aug. 16, 1975), 748
million from 1963 to 1975 (German Press Agency, Sept. 14, 1975), approximately
265 million from 1969 to 1975 (Welt, Oct. 20, 1976), 800 million from 1963 to 1976
(AFP, June 24, 1977), 720 million from 1962 to 1976 (Welt, Sept. 20, 1977), 500
million from 1963 to 1977 (Ehrich Mende, Oct. 9, 1977).
Raguse, supra note 3, at 590.
65. Wash. Post, May 19, 1978, at Cl, col. 2 (quoting the intelligence officer); M. MEYER,
supra note 5, at 193-99 (gauging the economic effects of the trade). One scholar suggested
that the economic benefits which the GDR began to enjoy from the traffic in 1964 prompted
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Despite the curtain of secrecy behind which the two Governments have sought to hide their dealings, the outlines of the intraGerman traffic in political prisoners are today clearly visible. For
almost eighteen years, the GDR and FRG, operating through private parties, have engaged in a systematic trade in human beings.
Although neither Stange nor Vogel has been designated an official
representative by their governments, both lawyers enjoy a broad
range of powers to arrange the affairs of their respective states.
Both men exercise a quasi-governmental function in their regulation of international penal affairs, and at least Vogel speaks freely
66
of the "mandate" which they possess to carry out their missions.
By covertly authorizing Stange and Vogel to exchange governmentally composed "inventory lists" of wants and supplies, to establish
prices, and to transport "cargoes" of prisoners to designated delivery points, the two German governments have treated the GDR's
political prisoners much like any other common article of commerce. On this description of the arrangements will the following
legal analysis lie.
II.

VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

4. Slavery
Does the intra-German trade in political prisoners represent a
modern form of slave trade, violative of international law?
Superficially, at least, several facets of the intra-German trade
in prisoners invite quick comparison to established aspects of the
international slave trade. Both institutions center upon the international movement of money or goods in exchange for control over
persons: (1) who are in captivity (2) in asserted violation of their
human rights and (3) who are allegedly compelled to perform
manual labor.6 7 Furthermore, while one might try to distinguish
the two trades on the basis that the FRG lays no claim to the liberty
of the persons whose release it purchases, the analogy may be preserved by portraying the FRG as the modern-day equivalent of a
nineteenth-century philanthropist engaging in the purchase of
officials to defne a 1964 general amnesty in a way which kept political prisoners behind bars
and ready for market. K. FRicKE, POLrrK UND JUSTIZ IN DER DDR 490 (1979).
66. See M. MEYER, supra note 5, at 49 (describing the unofficial nature of Stange and

Vogel's commission); id., at 218 (Vogel describing his mandate).
67. Although East German citizens are under an obligation to contribute their energies
to the development of socialist society, the compulsion referred to here is that of forced labor
within the GDR's penal institutions. See GEsIcliT ZuR WAND, supra note 33. Argument
over the legality of "correctional labor" is beyond the scope of this article.
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slaves for the purpose of granting them their freedom. By paying
the offeror's price, the philanthropist and FRG alike forward the
progress and the profit of the trade, making possible its very
existence.
Intriguing though it may be, the analogy is obviously somewhat strained (note, for instance, the ambiguity of the phrase "in
captivity"), and collapses completely when held up against the authoritative and binding definitions of slavery and slave trade that
are incorporated in the international anti-slavery conventions to
which both German states are parties. These conventions fall into
two distinct categories: (1) conventions directed against the "white
slave trade;"6 8 and, (2) a pair of major conventions prohibiting
chattel slavery and analogous institutions. Since the former category, relating to the enticement or entrapment of women into prostitution for the profit of others, is without direct relevance to this
Article, the latter category of conventions will be the focus of inquiry in the discussion that follows.
The Slavery Convention of 1926, as amended, 69 binds both the
GDR and the FRG (a) "[t]o prevent and suppress the slave trade;
[and] (b) [t]o bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the
complete abolition of slavery in all its forms."7 Similarly, Article
3(1) of the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to
Slavery,7 1 which also binds both states, proclaims: "[tihe act of
conveying or attempting to convey slaves from one country to another by whatever means of transport, or of being accessory thereto,
shall be a criminal offense under the laws of the States Parties to
this Convention. . . " In its preamble, the 1956 Supplementary
Convention made special reference to the 1948 Universal Declara68. For a list of and citations to the conventions against the white slave trade to which
the FRG and GDR have subscribed, see MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

PERFORMS FUNCTIONS -

LIST OF SIGNATURES, RATIFICA-

TIONS, ACCESSIONS, ETC. As OF 31 DECEMBER 1979, at 213-235 (1980). This source may be
used to verify the dates of accession given after treaty citations in the notes below.
69. Slavery Convention, openedforsignature Sept. 25, 1926, and amended by the Protocol, openedfor signature Dec. 7, 1953, 212 U.N.T.S. 17. Acceded to by the GDR on July 16,
1974; acceded to by the FRG on May 19, 1973.
70. Id., Art. 2.
71. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, openedfor signature Sept. 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3.
Acceded to by the GDR on July 16, 1974; ratified by the FRG on Jan. 17, 1959.
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tion of Human Rights,7 2 which in its Article 4 announces: "[n]o
one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade
shall be prohibited in all their forms." Finally, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," an instrument ratified by
the GDR and FRG, in Article 8 commands:
1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave trade
in all their forms shall be prohibited.
2. No one shall be held in servitude.
The obligation of both East Berlin and Bonn to eschew "slavery and the slave trade" assumes a critical importance. Incontrovertably established is the question of whether the definitions of
those terms under international law embrace the intra-German
trade in prisoners.
One of the "lasting achievements" of the 1926 Slavery Con74
vention was the formulation of legal definitions of its subjects.
Article 1 of the Convention declared:
(I) Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom
any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership
are exercised.
(II) The slave trade includes all acts involved in the capture,
acquisition, or disposal of a person with intent to reduce
him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a
slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of
disposal by sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a
view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act
of trade or transport in slaves. [Italics added]
In 1956, the Supplementary Convention was produced to cover
certain practices believed to have been missed by the 1926 document. Explicitly endorsing the 1926 definition of "slavery," the
1956 Convention supplemented it by enumerating and banning
several "institutions and practices similar to slavery," namely debt
bondage, serfdom, marriages imposed by parental fiat on unwilling
women, the transfer or inheritance of wives and the sham adoption
of children with a view to exploiting them or their labor.75 With
72.
(1948).
73.
2000A,
74.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/81 1, at 71

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res.
21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
See Nanda and Bassiouni, Slavery, Genocide, and Racial Discrimination, in I A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 503, at 509 (V. Nanda and M. Bassiouni eds.
1973).
75. Supplementary Convention, supra note 71, art. 1.
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regard to "the slave trade" the 1956 Convention made several slight
and one highly relevant modification in the 1921 definition:
'Slave trade' means and includes all acts involved in the capture,
acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to
slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view
to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by exchange of a
person acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged; and, in
general, every act of trade or transport
in slaves by whatever
76
means of conveyance. [Italics added]
Clearly at the core of the definitions offered in the 1926 and
1956 Conventions is the figure of the slave - a person over whom
the rights of ownership are asserted, much as they might be over
conventional chattels or real property. The unmistakable target of
both Conventions, judging from their antecedents, 77 titles, legislative history, and subsequent usage, 78 is the age-old institution of
chattel slavery.7 9 Since neither the GDR nor the FRG assert rights
of ownership over the GDR's prisoners, and since the anti-slavery
Conventions require (with only few exceptions) the involvement of
a slave in a transaction before their provisions will operate to prohibit it, the 1926 and 1956 Conventions do not appear to condemn
the intra-German trade in prisoners.
While the analogs to slavery and the slave trade enumerated
76. Id., art. 7, para. (c).
77. For brief accounts of the concerted international effort to extirpate slavery and the
slave trade, see Nanda and Bassiouni, supra note 74, at 506-22; A. VERDROSS & B. SIMMA,
UNIVERSALLE V6LKERRECHT 612-13 (1976); U.N. ECOSOC, Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery, The Suppression of Slavery (Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary General), U.N.
Doc. St/SOA/4 (1951); K. GLASER & S. POSSONY, VICTIMS OF POLITICS 454-56 (1979).

78. See, e.g., M. AWAD, REPORT ON SLAVERY, U.N. Doc. E/4168/Rev. 1 (1966). This
special report, designed to measure the degree of success which the anti-slavery conventions
had achieved, included a battery of questions concerning slavery and the slave trade. The
questions dwelt on matters involving "slaves" and "persons of servile status." No category of
persons in circumstances even faintly resembling those of the GDR's traded prisoners was
mentioned. See also K. GLASER & S. POSSONY, supra note 76, at 454-63. The GDR has
proclaimed itself free of any violations of the anti-slavery conventions. The Reply of the
Government of the German Democratic Republic Concerning the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to
Slavery of 1956, May 19, 1980, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.2/32/Add.1, at 7 (1980); The
Reply of the Government of the German Democratic Republic Concerning the Convention
on the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of
Others, May 19, 1980, E/Cn.4/Sub.2/Ac.2/33/Add.l, at 7 (1980).
79. For accounts of familiar forms of slavery, see C. RICE, THE RISE AND FALL OF
BLACK SLAVERY (1975) (richly annotated); E. G6RLICH, HERRENRECHT UND SKLAVENPEITSCHE (1971). Note, however, that apartheid has been attacked as a slavery-like practice.
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and outlawed in the 1956 Convention protect persons other than
the victims of traditional chattel slavery, they are few in number,
limited in range and manifestly inapplicable to the intra-German
transactions."0 Therefore, critics of the transactions are left with
one final straw at which to grasp. The substitution of the word
"person" for "slave" in one clause of Article 7, of the 1956 Convention - so that it now defines "all acts of disposal by exchange of a
person acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged" as forbidden slave trade - might permit a legal assault on the GDR for its
role in the prisoner trade.
It could be argued that the change made in the 1956 document
must be presumed to have meaning, that the plain meaning of "person" embraces all human beings, and that the GDR, in acceding to
the Supplementary Convention without reservation concerning this
clause, bound itself to abide by the treaty language. Such an assault, however, would probably fail for several reasons. First, the
GDR's defenders could convincingly contend that the state "acquires" its prisoners with a view to preserving public order, and is
then only coincidentally able to ameliorate their sentences by passing them into the West. Second, they could argue that the term
"persons" in Article 7, refers only to those individuals otherwise
affected by the Supplementary Convention (ie., chattel slaves, bartered wives, serfs, etc.). This argument is bolstered by the appearance in Section II (entitled "The Slave Trade") of nothing but
references to the trade in slaves. Third, they could point out that
the first line of Article 7 limits its definitions to "the purposes of the
present convention," and that the only flaf prohibition of "the slave
trade" per se is in the 1926 Convention, where the disputed definition still reads "slave," not person. Fourth, relying upon common
80. As summarized by the Anti-Slavery Society, the four practices identified and prohibited by the Supplementary Convention are:
DEBT BONDAGE is the state arising from a pledge by a debtor of his own personal services or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, when
the length and nature of the services is not defined nor does their value diminish the
debt.
SERFDOM is the condition of a tenant who must live and labour on the land of
another person, whether for reward or not, and who is not free to change his status.
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN-any practice whereby a person under 18
years old is delivered by parent or guardian to another person, whether for reward
or not, with a view to exploiting him or his labour.
SERVILE FORMS OF MARRIAGE--any institution whereby a woman, without
the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on payment of a consideration
in money or in kind, or may be transferred to another person or, on the death of her
husband, may be inherited by another person.
Quoted in K. GLASER & S. POSSONY, supra note 77, at 454.
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sense and intuition, they could argue that the term "slave trade"
naturally connotes the trade in slaves. Fifth, taking a positivist
stance, the GDR's champions could insist that the post-1963 accession of the GDR to the Supplementary Convention evidences that:
(a) the GDR did not consider the common interpretation among
states of the clause to reach so far as to prohibit its arrangements
with West Germany; and, (b) even if other states did so believe, the
GDR did not intend to be bound in such a fashion, as its subsequent behavior demonstrated. Sixth, the practice of states has not
been to invoke the Supplementary Convention in instances where

one state has seized individuals in the hope of extorting concessions
(e.g., the return of a deposed ruler, like the Shah of Iran) from another. Additional support for this point comes from the silence
with which other states have met reports of the intra-German deals.
While none of the foregoing arguments are irrebuttable, they in
tandem make a plausible case, which may be all that is needed by
the GDR to defend its position.
The anti-slavery Conventions do not appear to proscribe the
intra-German deals, and in the absence of conventions, even so re-

pugnant an institution as slavery might be legal under international
law." l This study turns now to other bodies of international legal
doctrine for possible proscriptions.
B. State Hostage-Taking/StateKidnapping/Ransom
Is the intra-German trade in East and West German citizens
who are confined in the GDR's prisons for political crimes a form
of state hostage-taking prohibited by international law?
Since at least the time of the Babylonian Empire, the law has
concerned itself with the seizure of individuals by sovereigns who
seek to wrest property from parties beyond their grasp. An entire
section of the Code of Hammurabi, the oldest known codification
of law, was devoted to the limitation of the state's duty to ransom
its subjects from foreign captivity. 2 Because ransom agreements
tend to expose the reach and the limits of both the captor's and the
81. See, e.g., J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 240 (5th ed. 1955) ("Apart from convention, slave-trading is not illegal by international law."); L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 733 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955) (Observing that it is difficult to say customary
international law prohibits slavery).
82. § 32 Code of Hammurabi (about 2250 B.C.), translatedandreprinted in R. HARPER,
THE CODE OF HAMMURABI KiNo OF BABYLON 21-23 (1904).
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ransomer's power, and because word of a fat ransom can spur inactive hostage-takers to pursue either the flush captor or the pliant
ransomer, the historical record of the precise terms of ransom deals
is often scanty. 3 Nonetheless, the source materials are sufficient to
reveal a persistent pattern of state hostage-taking and ransom-making from ancient times through today. 4 Historically, the parties
who have stepped forward to purchase the freedom of captives
have been the captive himself, his family, his guild, a chilvalric or-

der, his home city, his vassal, his church, or his state.85
Viewed in a harsh light, the intra-German exchanges consist of
the GDR, a State actor, seizing East and West German citizens
under color of East German law8 6 and then selectively ransoming
them at variable prices to the West German Government.8 7 If this
formulation passes the test of legality under international law, then
other descriptions more favorable to the GDR's cause will also escape condemnation.
A cluster of international legal instruments touch upon the

topic of hostage-taking and ransoming. Some of them focus upon
the regulation of state action against state hostages, while others are
directed against various forms of private hostage-taking. All but
one have little or no bearing on the intra-German prisoner exchanges. The first class of conventions pertains to the regulation of
state hostage-taking in times of war.8' Although a comprehensive
83. A. ERLER, DER LOSKAUF GEFANGENER 17-18, 58 (1978).

84. Id., 7-74. During the medieval era, for instance, many of the most celebrated personages were at some point hostages for ransom. Among them were Frederick the Fair of
Austria (1325), Richard the Lion-Hearted of England (1194), Joan of Arc (1430), and the
French monarchs John 11 (1360), Louis IX [St. Louis] (ca. 1250), and Francis 1 (1526). Id.,
20, 42-44. In medieval Spain, the capture and ransom of hostages was so routine that a
public office of ransom-broker Vlfaqueque] was instituted. Id., 104-08. For modem instances of ransom hostage-taking, see Mnyra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
85. Id., 18-41.
86. The GDR also maintains that it has an obligation under international law to confine
persons threatening the GDR's border security and, iso facto, international peace. Fricke,
supra note 37, at 128.
87. Citizens of non-German states are sometimes prematurely released from East German jails as a result of special inter-governmental arrangements. Only intra-German cases
fall within the scope of this Article.
88. See, e.g., Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
openedfor signature Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, U.S.T. 539, 1 Bevans 63 1; Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, openedfor signature Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
openedfor signature, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Relevant extracts and other pertinent
documents are reprinted in K. LANGENSTEIN, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DEs GEISELRECHTS IN

NEURER ZErr Al-G21 (1970).

For a discussion of the pre-1945 rules governing wartime
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peace treaty to resolve World War II in the European theatre has
still not been signed, a war of the kind necessary to invoke the martial conventions does not currently rage in Germany. The second
class is variegated, and embraces the 1970 Hague Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 9 the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
Civil Aviation,' and the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
including Diplomatic Agents. 9 ' Keyed to the prevention of highly
specific forms of hostage-taking, conventions of this second class
have not been directed toward practices like those of the GDRFRG arrangements. Of great interest, however, is the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,9 2 to which the
FRG, but not the GDR, is a signatory.9 3
The as-of-yet unratified 1979 Convention does not deal specifically with hostage taking performed by a state. Yet, several of its
clauses are of direct relevance to the intra-German trade. The Preamble of the Convention unequivocally proclaims:
...[T]he taking of hostages is an offence of grave concern to the
internationalcommunity and ... in accordance with .. . this
convention, any person committing an act of hostage taking shall
be either prosecuted or extradited. [Emphasis added]
Article 1 of the Convention defines the prohibited action in this

manner:
1. Anyperson who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain anotherperson ... in order to
hostage-taking, see G. VOLLMER, EwrwIcKaELUo UND HEuTnGE BEDEUTUNG DER GEISELscHAFT 55-68 (1926).
89. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done Dec. 16, 1970,
22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192.
90. Convention to Discourage Acts of Violence Against Civil Aviation, done Sept. 23,
1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
91. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, opened/or signature Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.N.

GAOR Supp. (No. 30) 147, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 41 (1974).
92. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, openedfor signature Dec.
18, 1979, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 46) 245, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/146 (1980), reprinted in
40 ZErrscHRiFT FOR AUSLA.NDISCHES OFFENTLICHES REcHT UND V6LKERRECHT 304-11
(1980) and in, 18 LL.M. 1457 (1979). See Platz, InternationaleKonvention gegen Geiselnahme,
id., at 276-311. See generaly Rosenstock, International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages: Another International Community Step Agaunst Terrorism, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 169-95 (1980).
93. The FRG signed the Convention on Dec. 19, 1979.
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compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or
a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an
explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage
commits the offence of taking of hostages ...
2. Any person who:
(b) participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits
or attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking likewise commits an offence. . . . [Emphasis added.]
Article 3 of the Convention requires:
1. The State Party in the territory of which the hostage is held
by the offender shall take all measures it considers appropriate to ease the situation of the hostage, in particular, to secure his release and, after his release, to facilitate, when
relevant, his departure ...
Klaus Wilhelm Platz, Reporting Legation Counsel of the West
German Foreign Ministry (which spearheaded the drive for the
Convention), illuminated the scope of Article 1 in these terms:
The definition [in Article 1] . . . is abstract and politically neutral. Thus, any person can be an offender, that is, not only a
private person, but also, for example, a state functionary operating in his official capacity, regardless of his rank. . . . This is
true for the instigation of or participation in [a hostage taking]
• . . as well. . . . [T]he motive and the peculiar political circumstances of a hostage taking, in terms of the definition in Art. 1 of
the Convention, is also irrelevant.94
Does this mean that the GDR should shun the opportunity to
sign the Convention? Not necessarily, for the GDR has ready two
impressive defenses against attacks based upon the wording of the
Convention for its part in the exchange deals. First, Article 13 of
the Convention, incorporated into the document at Soviet insistance, provides:
This Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed
within a single state, the hostage and the alleged offender are
nationals of that State and the alleged offender is found in the
territory of that State.
94. Platz, supra note 92, at 286-87. [Translation by the author.] See also Note, The
United Nations Effort to Draft a Convention on the Taking of Hostages, 27 AM. U. L. REv.
431-81 (1978); Report of the Ad Hoe Committee on the Drafting on an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 36, U.N. Doc. A/
32/39 (1977) (statement by the Syrian delegate that the Convention should reach state hostage-taking); id., at 63-64 (statements by the FRG and Mexico that persons acting as state

agents would fall within the scope of the Convention).
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Through this loophole slips the GDR's trade of East Germans to
the West in entirety. Second, Article 1, paragraph 1, defines a hostage-taking in terms of the hostage-taker's intent. The GDR could
easily and persuasively maintain that it seizes none of its political
prisoners, East German or otherwise, "in order to compel" a third
party to deliver up some concession. The obvious argument would
again be that the GDR imprisons "enemies of the State" for security reasons, and then only fortuitously is able to do the prisoners,
the FRG, and itself a favor by trading them to the West.
Thus, in terms of the codified international law on hostagetaking, the intra-German prisoner exchanges again pass muster. A
consideration of the applicability of the general rules of international law, as evidenced by the practice of states, the rulings of international tribunals, and the opinions of publicists, to the intraGerman exchanges is next in order.
C

GeneralPrinciples Of InternationalLaw

From the perspective of both the GDR and the international
community," the individuals traded in the intra-German exchanges fall into two categories: citizens of the GDR (domestic)
and citizens of the FRG (foreign). Traditionally, the general rules
of international law have shielded nationals of one State from certain forms of mistreatment at the hands of the prosecutorial and
penal officials of another State (e.g., inhumane prison conditions,
flagrant disregard of rudimentary principles of fairness, etc).9 6 The
obligations imposed by these rules notwithstanding, and absent a
95. The Bonn Government persists in refusing to recognize a separate GDR nationality.
See 22 RECHT IN OST UND WEST 279-80 (1978). The GDR insists that separate East German and West German citizenships exist, and accuses the FRG of interfering with the sovereignty of the GDR in maintaining the contrary position. Riege, Die
Staatsangehirigkei'sdoktrinder BARD - Interpretation und Konsequenzen, 33 N.J. 68-71
(1979); Interview with Erich Honecker, Feb. 6, 1981, in 14 DEUTSCHLAND ARCHlV 318, 32021 (1981). The 1973 admission of both the FRG and the GDR to the United Nations, as well
as the practice of an increasing number of states that permit East Berlin to exercise protective
powers over GDR passport bearers abroad, make the GDR's position the more tenable for
purposes of this analysis. See generally G. REss, DIE RECHTSLAGE DEUTSCHLANDS NACH
DEM GRUNDLAGENVERTRAG VoM 21. DEZEMBER 1972, at 203-14 (1978); Scheuner, Die
deutsche einheitliche Staitsangehdrigke." Einfortdauerndes Problem der deutschen Teilung,
34 EUROPA ARCHiv 345-56 (1979); see supra note 43.
96. For a collection of materials relating to the duty of states to guarantee foreigners a
minimum standard of justice and safety within their borders, see L. SOHN, INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIoHTS (1973). See especially The Chattin Case, Mexico v. United
States, General Claims Commission, 4 RIAA 282-312 (1951).
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specific binding international agreement to the contrary, do not indicate in the sources of international law that a State need eschew
demands for material compensation in negotiating with another
State the terms of a premature release of persons serving criminal
sentences. In other words, if no rule of international law prohibits
the GDR from hanging a price over the heads of East German citizens, the same probably holds true for their West German
97
cellmates.

The history of the past century is replete with examples of state
traffic in human beings.9" Since World War II, however, the annals

have been virtually bare of condemnations of state involvement in
peacetime ransom hostage-taking as a violation per se of general
international law.9 9 While many of the seizures and payments have

not been well-publicized, it appears that participant states have
shrouded them in silence for political or strategic reasons, and not
because of a belief that such transactions (performed upon persons
lacking diplomatic immunities and under color of national law) are
illegal. The silence of other states and publicists upon learning of
the arrangements promotes the persuasiveness of this conclusion.
Sufficient to illustrate the point are several historical examples of
one state trading or proposing to trade its nationals to another in
exchange for material concessions.
97. The precise number of West German citizens ransomed out of East German cells
remains a state secret. However, insofar as payments for the release of West Germans are
made, the claim that payments are demanded solely to compensate the GDR for resources
"wasted" upon the exiting individuals is discredited. Of course, defenders of the GDR's
position could assert that payments for East German prisoners are made to offset resources
expended in their upbringing, while payments for West Germans are made to offset the
damage their criminal acts inflicted upon the GDR.
98. See K. LANGENSTEIN, supra note 88, at 66-175; R. KELLER, DER GEISEL IM
MODERNEN VOLKERRECHT 13-18 (1932). Obviously, the definition of the phrase "traffic in
human beings" [Menschenhandel] is rather elastic. Extraditions which involve a negotiated
quidpro quo could be viewed as a kind of traffic in human beings, for example. The recent
Iranian hostage crisis provided a spectacular illustration of inter-governmental haggling over
the terms of an exchange involving captives. Only passing mention is made of the Iranian
deal here, however, because it involved elements which clearly set it apart from the intraGerman deals, e.g., diplomatic immunities, non-Iranian hostages, a settlement trained upon
Iranian (not American) assets.
99. See general, K. LANGENSTEIN, .upra note 88, at 232-45. Langenstein studied the
post-1945 works of 34 prominent legal commentators from 8 countries and found that the
overwhelming majority of them believed state hostage-taking to be legal under international
law. (Langenstein's attention was focused upon state practice in martial situations.) Id., at
239-45. Prior to World War II, several scholars advanced the view that hostage taking had
forever died out as a practice of civilized nations, but this view was arguably wrong on the
facts and was in any event refuted by the events that followed. Id. at 164-75; R. KELLER,
supra note 98, at 13-18.
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1. The Case of Nazi Germany. In December, 1938, Dr.
Hjalmar Schacht, president of the German Reichsbank, proposed
to George Rublee, the first director of the London-based Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IRR), a plan whereby Nazi
Germany would both rid itself of unwanted German Jews and acquire a new source of critically needed foreign currency. Schacht's
plan called for the establishment of a trust in Germany holding one
and one-half billion marks worth of expropriated Jewish property.
"World Jewry" would raise an equivalent amount in foreign currencies and would then lend this money as start-up capital to emigrating German Jews, using the property in trust as security for the
loans. Interest and amortization of the loan would be charged
against the trust, with such charges paid for in foreign currencies
raised from an increase of German exports over their normal level.
The obvious effect of the plan would be to move foreign currencies
into Germany and Jewish refugees out, with the continuation of the
latter undoubtedly contingent upon the achievement of the
former. oo
The Schacht plan underwent several permutations and
spawned several committees,' 0° but eventually failed because of
diplomatic irresolution on both sides and fears within the democracies that involvement in the scheme might abet Germany's ends or
imply approval of anti-Semetism. An object of intense criticism,
the plan was also rejected by many influential parties, such as the
American Jewish Congress, anti-German lobbies, and liberal publication's because it lent credence to the myth of International Jewry
and because it smacked of extortion, blackmail, and refugee barter. 10 2 Overall, the criticism was buttressed upon moral, political,
and economic foundations, and not upon a portrayal of the scheme
incompatable with the rules of international
as fundamentally
03
law. 1
A second Nazi attempt (with the compliance of the Hungarian
leadership) to vend individuals under its control involved Hun100. D. WYMAN, PAPER WALLS 53 (1968); H. FEINOOLD, THE POLITICS OF RESCUE 49-

58 (1970); A. MORSE, WHILE SIX MILLION DIED 241-42 (1967).
101.

D. WYMAN, supra note 100, at 53-54.

102. H. FEINGOLD, supra note 100, at 69-89.
103. See generally id., at 5 1-53; D. WYMAN, supra note 100, at 51-57; A. MORSE, supra
note 100, at 241-51. The materials noted in the annotations provided by Feingold and by

Wyman are especially useful.
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garian Jews in the so-called "blood for trucks" ransom proposal of
1944. Working through intermediaries, the Nazi Government reportedly informed Washington that as many as 1,000,000 Jews
scheduled for ultimate liquidation would be given their freedom in
exchange for 2,000,000 cakes of soap, 200 tons of cocoa, 800 tons of
coffee, 200 tons of tea, and 10,000 trucks. The ransom demand was
later modified to include only the trucks and armaments for "use
on the eastern front." The Western Allies indignantly dismissed
the offer as a Nazi ploy to split the Alliance into two camps. ' As
the German Reich crumbled, ransom offers proliferated. Rescue
advocates, such as Soly Meyer, operating out of Switzerland succeeded in freeing many Jews from the death camps in exchange for
deposits of huge sums of money in blocked Swiss accounts, none of
which ever actually came into Nazi possession."t 5 Again, both the
proposed and the executed prisoner exchange agreements of this
period appear to have escaped international legal censure. Lest
prisoner ransom arrangements appear a peculiarly Germanic phenomenon, an example involving exchanges between the United
States and Cuba is appropriate.
2. The Case of the United States and Cuba. In the wake of
the 1961 Bay of Pigs debacle, over eleven hundred Cuban emigres
and a smattering of their American advisors, the so-called Cuban
Brigade, sat moldering in Fidel Castro's prisons. A month after the
abortive invasion attempt, the Cuban leader offered to exchange
the prisoners to the United States for 500 D-8 Super Caterpillar
bulldozers, a ransom he later modified to their cash equivalent, an
estimated $28 million. Strong anti-Cuban sentiment in the United
States delayed until April 1962 the American response of $28 million in pledges of agricultural products, by which time the Cubans
had raised their price to $62 million. As a sign of his continued
good faith, however, Castro at that time released sixty sick and
wounded prisoners for a promised $2.9 million, which he later
agreed to accept in medicine and food. l ° 6 The Cuban Missile Crisis froze the negotiations at this point until November, 1962, when
a special governmental task force spearheaded by James B. Donovan (who had earlier managed the Abel-Powers exchange in which
104. See generally H. FEINGOLD, supra note 100, at 270-76.
105. Id., at 276-80.

106. The story of the ransom agreements with Cuba is ably and sympathetically told in
A. SCHLESINGER, ROBERT KENNEDY AND HIS TIMES 468-71, 534-43 (1973).

On the pre-

Missile Crisis developments, see i., at 468-71.
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Wolfgang Vogel played an integral part) began to drum up donations from the pharmaceutical industry and others to meet Castro's
demand for $62 million worth of selected medicines. In late December, 1963, after the final shipments of medicines to Cuba had
been completed, 1113 Cuban prisoners were released and flown to
Miami.'l 7 On-going efforts by Donovan and his colleagues secured
by July 4, 1963, the release of nearly 10,000 Cubans and Americans
from Cuban jails.'0 Like the World War II proposals, the CubanAmerican agreements attracted much critical commentary, but
again there apparently was no assault upon the propriety of the
arrangements as a matter of international law. The caustic remarks
°9
were aimed instead at the wisdom and morality of the deals.1
Two less directly comparable yet nonetheless highly illuminating recent situations involving individuals detained by state actors
for political reasons merit brief mention. Both demonstrate the
freedom with which states use the liberty of individuals as a bargaining chip in international negotiation.
3. Other Cases in Point. First, in driving for a relaxation of
the Soviet Union's restraints on Jewish emigration, the United
States has for years dangled various economic concessions (e.g.
most-favored-nation status) before the noses of the Kremlin's negotiators." O Second, the condemnations of the Iranian Government
for violations of international law during the 1978-80 hostage crisis
in Iran, featured attacks upon the actions which enabled Iran to
bargain from a position of power, for example, by disregarding diplomatic immunities. However, the condemnations did not allege
contraventions of international law in American and Iranian efforts
to strike a negotiated solution, involving a trade of frozen Iranian
assets (property) for the hostages (individuals). "' In both cases, the
conditions which made the handlings possible were assailed as vio107. Id., at 534-43.
108. J. DONOVAN, CHALLENGES 92 (1967).
109. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 106, at 468-69.

110. See H. KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 1271-72 (1978) (commenting on the Jackson Amendment). See also Korey, The Future of Soyiet Jewry, Emigration andAssimilation,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 67, 74-79 (1979-80).
111. See, e.g., Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran,
United States of American v. Iran, (1979) I.C.J. 1, reprinted in 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 258-83
(1980). See generally Gross, he Case Concerning United States D#7lomatic and Consular
Staff in Tehran: Phase of ProvisionalMeasures, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 395-410 (1980); FaIlk,
Comment, The Iran Hostage Crisis: Easy Answers and Hard Questions, id., at 411-17.
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lations of international law, but the participation in the handlings
themselves went unchallenged.
Thus, a State's decision to release and expel prisoners before
the expiration of their sentences in exchange for another State's
property does not appear to be a violation of international law. In
fact, such international exchanges may well help States bring themselves into compliance with human rights accords, as will be shown

next.
D.

Gordian Knots. InternationalCovenants

A favorite whipping boy of both critics of the GDR and proponents of the right to free migration has been the GDR's restric-

tive emigration policy." 2

A quick survey of some of the

international covenants and proclamations concerning the right to
emigrate to which the GDR has put its signature (or otherwise indicated a willingness to comply) reveals just cause for the

complaints."t3 -

112. See, e.g., Tomuschat, Freizllgigkeit nach deutschem Recht und Viilkerrecht, 27 DIE
OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 751-65 (1974); W. S6LYOM-FEKETE, LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON

FOREIGN TRAVEL BY THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 14 (1978); Turack, Freedom of
TransnationalMovement: the HelsinkiAccord and Beyond, II VAND. J. TRANSNT'L L. 585,
593-97 (1978); Mampel, supra note 18, at 32-34; M. KRIELE, supra note 48, at 32-34. For
discourses upon the right to free emigration that are particularly attentive or relevant to the

German situation, see Chalidze, The Right ofa Convicted Citizen to Leave His Country, 8
HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 1-13 (1973); Berman, The Right of Convicted Citizens to Emigrate:.A
Comment on the Essay by VN. Chalidze, id., at 15-20; Toman, The Right to Leave and to
Return in Eastern Europe, in THE RIGHT To LEAVE AND To RETURN 119-64 (K. Vasak and
S. Liskofsky eds. 1976); F. GIL, DIE AUS- UND EINWANDERUNGSFREIHErr ALS MENSCHENRECHT (1976); Scheuner, Die Auswanderungsreitheit in der Verfassungsgeschichte und im
Vereassungsrecht Deutschland, in FESTSCHRIFT FuR RICHARD THOMA 119-224 (1950). A
path-breaking work upon the right to emigrate is J. INGLES, STUDY IN RESPECT OF THE
RIGHT OF EVERYONE To LEAVE ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING HIS OWN, AND To RETURN

To His COUNTRY, U.N. Doc. E/Cn.4/Sub.2/220/Rev. 1 (1963). For other commentaries of
general interest, see Nanda, The Right to Movement and TravelAbroad" Some Observations
on the U.N. Deliberations, DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109-22 (1971); Turack,A Brie/Review of
the Provisions in Recent Agreements ConcerningFreedom of Movement Issues in the Modern
World, II CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 95-115 (1979); Asbay, The Right to Leave and the Right
to Return, I COMP. L. Y.B. 121-36 (1977); Higgins, The Right in InternationalLaw of an
Individual to Enter, Stay In, and Leave a Country, 49 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 341-57
(1973); Note, The Relation othe Helsnki FinalAct to the Emigration fSoviet Jews, I B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 111-47 (1977); Van Den Berg and Simons, The Soviet Union and Human
Rights Legislation: The Shchransky Case, 11 CALIF. W. INT'L L. J. 479, 481-90 (1981).
113. A congeries of intra-German agreements containing operative obligations affecting
the movement of persons between the GDR and the FRG is omitted from this quick survey.
Limited in their ambition, their explication here would only distract from the development
of this Article's theme. For a sampling of the special agreements, see the Agreement Between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on the
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1. The United Nations Charter. Although the United Nations Charter contains no language explicitly endorsing a right to
free emigration or shielding political dissidents from governmental
harassment, Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Charter does instruct its
signatories (including, since 1973, the GDR) to cooperate in "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for funda-

mental freedoms for all.

.

.. 11'l4

Although arguably qualified by

the Article 2, paragraph 7 reservation of matters "essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state" to the signatories, the Charter is of unquestionable relevance where, as in the case of the GDR,
a state has "internationalized" the subjects of its alleged transgressions by ratifying international covenants and participating in the
formulation of multinational declarations. I 5
2. The UniversalDeclarationofHuman Rights. With regard
to the right to emigrate, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human

Rights

6

proclaims:

Article 13
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any17 country, including his
own, and to return to his country.
Article 14
(1) Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution.
Transit Traffic of Civilian Persons and Goods between the Federal Republic of Germany
and Berlin (West), Dec. 17, 1971, reprintedin BUNDESMINISTERiUM FtR INNERDEUTSCHE
BEZIEHUNGEN, ZEHN JAHRE DEUTSCHLAND POLITIK 169-74 (1979); Arrangement between
the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Senate on Facilitating and
Improving the Traffic of Travellers and Visitors, Dec. 20, 1971, reprintedin id., at 175-78, and
in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 726 (1972); Treaty on the Basis of Intra-German Relations, June 20,
1973, German Democratic Republic-Federal Republic of Germany, reprintedin 12 INT'L
LEGAL MAT. 16 (1973). See general, G. REss, supra note 95. Also worth mentioning but
peripheral to this discussion because of the GDR's non-participation in it is the European
Convention of Human Rights, which in Protocol No. 4, Art. 2, Para. 2, guarantees the right
to emigrate. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol No. 4 done Sept. 16,
1963.
114. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 3. (Ratified by the GDR on Sept. 23, 1973. GB1.DDR
II, No. 14, at 145 (1973).) The Preamble to the Charter notes that one of the ends that
inspired the foundation of the United Nations was the aim "to reaffirm faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person."
115. Mahnke, Menschenrechte und nationales Ineresse, 22 RECHT IN OST UND WEST
193-206 (1978).
116. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948).
117. For a description of Article 13, paragraph 2's "legislative history," see F. GIL, supra
note 112, at 130-34.
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Article 15
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor

denied the right to change his nationality." '
The impediments which the GDR has placed on westward migration obviously derogate from these provisions.
Also of pertinence to the GDR's treatment of political prisoners, but too broad in scope to be thoroughly discussed here, are the
Declaration's assertions. Under Article 2, no one shall be denied
the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration because of
political or other opinion. Under Article 5, no one shall be subjected to degrading treatment. Under Article 6, everyone has the
right to recognition as a person before the law, and, finally, under
Article 19, everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the freedom to hold opinions without interference
and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas regardless of
frontiers."19
As recently as 1975, the GDR formally acknowledged an obligation to adhere to the Declaration. 120 Yet, because the Declaration was promulgated as a non-binding General Assembly
Resolution,' 2' and because the practice of States has not yet ensconded the aforementioned provisions in the firmament of universally recognized immutable rights, 2 1 it is difficult, relying solely
118. The availability of Article 15 as a device for criticizing the GDR is made problematic by the complex German nationality question. See note 95, supra. There is considerable
disagreement as to whether there is one German nationality, two separate German nationalities, one German nationality with two state citizenships, etc.
119. On the GDR's repressive political controls, see the sources cited in note 23, supra;
GESICHT ZUR WAND, supra note 33.

120. In principle VII of the non-binding Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, the Parties agreed:
In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating states will
act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ...
73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323, 325 (1975); 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1295 (1975).
121. The ratification of several binding human rights Covenants has made the controversy over the binding or non-binding nature of the Declaration less critical than it once was,
at least with respect to the right to emigrate. On the non-binding nature of the Declaration,
see Judge Lauterpacht's Seperate Opinion in the Southwest Africa Case: Voting Procedure,
[19551 I.C.J. 114-21; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW 282-85 (1976); M.
WHITEMAN, 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 (1965). Cf. Comment, Aliyah of Soviet
Jews. Protection ofthe Atght of Emigration under International Law, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 89,
97-99 (1973) (stressing the authority of the Declaration); South West Africa Cases, Second

Phase, [1966] I.C.J. 6, at 293 (Tanaka, J., dissenting, noting that "although not binding in
itself, [the Universal Declaration].. . constitutes evidence of the interpretation and application of the relevant Charter provisions").
122. Eg., among the Communist states, only Cuba recognizes a right to free emigration.
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upon the Declaration, to pin the GDR with a violation of international law.
3. International Human Rights Agreements. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 2 3 ratified by the GDR on March 27, 1973, binds all

participating States under Article 5, "to guarantee the right of everyone.

. .

to equality before the law . . .in the enjoyment of...

[t]he right to leave any country including one's own, and to return
to one's country." Although expressly targeted against discrimination on the basis of "race, colour, or national or ethnic origin," the
language of Article 5 does not restrict its operation to these categories. Discrimination on the basis of age, such as the GDR's practice
of permitting pensioners but few younger East Germans to visit the
FRG, 2 4 arguably falls within the Convention's prohibition. More
important than the question of whether the GDR unlawfully discriminates, however, is its ratification of a document listing the
right to emigrate as a fundamental human right.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,' 25
ratified by the GDR on March 27, 1973, provides under Article 12
that "[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his
own." Although qualified by an ordrepublic derogation clause, discussed below, this bold statement of right casts long shadows over
the purported legality of the GDR's entire emigration control
scheme.
The guarantee of a right to emigrate included in the GDR's 1949 Constitution was deleted
from the 1968 Constitution. See VERF.DDR, Art. 10 (1949); S. MEMPEL, DIE SOZIALISTISCHE
VERFASSUNG

DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN

REPUBLIK, TEXT UND KOMMENTAR

218-31, 236-47, 695-700 (1972). See generally P. BENGELSDORF, DAS RECHT ZUM VERLASSEN DES STAATSGEBIETES IN DEN DEUTSCHEN VERFASSUNGEN VON 1919-64, 321-22 (1965).
See also D. CHILDS, EAST GERMANY 88 (1969) (contending that the GDR's issuance of
passports at the state's convenience on a purely political basis was indistinguishable from the
1969 practice of many Communist states and assorted Western nations, such as Portugal,
Spain, Turkey, Greece, and Iran).
123. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, entered intoforce Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. Ratified by the GDR
on March 27, 1973.
124. See supra note 13.
125. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)
52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). The Covenant came into force on March 23, 1976. 13 U.N.
CHRON. 73 (1976). The GDR ratified it on Nov. 8, 1973. The FRG followed suit on Dec. 17,
1973. The GDR's overall performance under this Covenant is evaluated in Bruns, Aenschenrechtspakte und de DDR, 11 DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV 848-53 (1978).
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Among the parts of the Covenant more directly opposed to
features of the GDR's treatment of political prisoners, particularly
with regard to their "sale," are Article 7 (prohibition of degrading
treatment); Article 10 ("[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall
be treated with. . . respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person"); Article 18 (freedom of conscience); Article2619 (freedom of
opinion); and Article 22 (freedom of association).'
Thus, both the GDR's practice of incarcerating would-be refugees and its manner of granting their freedom (that is, by treating
them as articles of commerce, like prize cattle or swine) are suspect

under this Covenant.
4. Helsinki Declaration. As with the Universal Declaration,
the GDR in 1975 proclaimed in Principle VII of the non-binding
Helsinki Declaration that it would "fulfill. . . [its] obligations as set
forth in the international declarations and agreements in. . . [the
human rights] field, including, inter alia, the International Cove-

nants on Human Rights by which

.

. [it] may be bound."''

27

In

the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) held at Helsinki, 128 the GDR not only pledged to
respect the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenants on Human Rights, and other existing international human
rights declarations and treaties, but also joined in giving detailed
(albeit non-binding)129 assurances of its intent to relax its restrictive
126. Articles 12, 18, 19, and 22 contain "ordrepublic" derogation clauses. For more on
these clauses, see infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
127. Final Act, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 73 DEP'T ST. BULL.
323, 325 (1975); 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1295 (1975).
128. Id.
129. "The Helsinki Final Act does not create new and immediate legal obligations. It
either confirms the existence of preexisting legal obligations, sometimes making them more
specific, or it gives rise to moral and political obligations." Jonathan and Jacqu6, Obligations
Assumed by the Helsinki Signatories, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
HELSINKI ACCORD 48 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977). See also Mahnke, Die Prinzipienerklarung
der KSZE-Schlussakte und das Vlkerrechi - VIkerrechtlicheAspekie der deutschen Frage,
21 RECHT IN OST UND WEST 45, 46 (1977); Malnke, supra note 115, at 205-06; Russell, The
Helsinki Declaration Brobdingnag or Lilliput, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 242, 246-49 (1976);
Schachter, The Twilight Existence ofNon-Binding International.4greements,71 AM. J. INT'L
L. 296 (1977); Schweissfurth, Zur Frageder Rechtsnatur, Verbindlichkeit und viblkerrechtlichen
Relevanz der KSZE-Schlussakte, 36 ZEITSCHRIFT F0R OFFENTLICHS RECHT UND
V6LKERRECHT 681-726 (1976). Nonetheless, the Helsinki Accord has been termed a document of "great legal significance." Buergenthal, InternationalHuman Rights Law and the
Helsinki Final.4ct: Conclusions, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI AccORD 6-7 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977); Turack, .4 Brie/ Review of the Provisions in
Recent Agreements ConcerningFreedom ofMovement Issues in the Modern World,supra note
112, at 105. The GDR's representative to the Conference, in fact, characterized the Final Act
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regime of border controls.
"Basket Three" of the Declaration included explicit promises
to promote the reunification of families, to expand personal contacts between the citizens of all participating states, to improve the
movement of information across borders, and to facilitate the transfrontier movement of persons for personal or professional reasons.
With regard to the last-mentioned point, the GDR expressed its
intent "gradually to simplify and to administer flexibly the procedures for exit and entry; to ease regulations concerning movement
of citizens from the other participating states in their territory, with
due regard to security requirements. . .[and) to lower, where necessary, the fees for visas and official travel documents." 13 0 While not
expressly endorsing a general right to emigrate, the GDR reaffirmed its commitment to documents that do, and provided its coto challenge the GDR's implemensignatories with ample standing
31
pledges.1
Helsinki
its
of
tation

III.

THE INTRA-GERMAN ARRANGEMENT: MERITS
AND DEMERITS

A.

Merits

Ironically, the GDR's systematic sale of political prisoners to
the West not only escapes outright condemnation under international law (that is, the prescriptions against slavery and hostagetaking), but in a qualified and paradoxical way, it actually merits a
word of commendation, for the ransom deals advance a goal at the
heart of the provisions on free emigration and political expression
in the human rights documents mentioned above. To put the obvious point succinctly, the exchanges foster the transnational movement of persons and ideas. By means of transplantation, the
as an international instrument and its catalog of principles as directly applicable international law. See Bock, Festigung der Sicherheit in Europa, Kernstack der Schlussake Yon Helsinki, 20 DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK 1263, 1630 (1975); Neues Deutschland, Oct. 3 and Oct.
4/5, 1975, repritedin 8 DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV 1207 (1975). See also Chowdhury, Human
Rights and the Helsinki Accords. Belgrade and Beyond, in CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF
THE WORLD, 9TH, MADRID (PROJECTED WORK PAPERS), No. 13 (1979) (arguing that the

Final Act is binding despite the numerous disclaimers of the parties).
130. 73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323, 339-48 (1975); 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1313-24 (1975).
131. See Henkin, Human Rights and "DomesticJurisdiction",in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 21, 35 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977); Turack, A
Brie/Review of the Provisions in Recent Agreements Concerning Freedom ofMovement Issues
in the Modern World, supra note 112, at 105-06.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

35

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2 [], Art. 2
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 12

exchanges liberate individuals from repressive governmental strictures on their ability to cultivate and express their political, economic, or philosophical identities. Thus, in a neat bundling of
interests, the intra-German exchanges simultaneously promote high
humanitarian ideals and serve the less lofty ends of the participant
states.
In human terms, this means that individuals who would have
otherwise suffered in harsh prison conditions and afterwards borne
a stigma of untrustworthiness instead are able to resume full productive lives in the West. 132 On the other side of the border, East
German consumers deprived by political circumstance from access
to certain goods are permitted, as a result of the ransom shipments,
to enhance their lives with desired articles. Surely few of the individuals directly touched by the exchanges would complain of a
denigration of their human dignity on account of the manner by
which the Bonn Government redeemed their liberty. In fact, one
could argue that the West German payments are no more than
grandiose international versions of the fines paid in lieu of incarceration in petty domestic cases. The practice proceeds so routinely
that the GDR could be said to be engaging in tacit sentencing-inthe-alternative ("five years or two years and $30,000").
On a more exalted plane, the ransom deals serve an aim of
international law insofar as they serve as a peaceful means of dispute avoidance and resolution. 133 As intermediary Vogel observed,
"[o]ur activity is a factor in the relaxation of tensions between East
and West. Every spy, every refugee, every dissident that we exchange is one problem less, one source of friction fewer between
' 34
both German states, and, consequently, between East and West."'
B.

Demerits

These "merits" notwithstanding, there exists an obvious, and
perhaps countervailing, pair of "demerits" which must also be considered. The first demerit, has a positivistic slant, while the latter
appeals to naturalistic leanings.
First, the intra-German arrangements simultaneously rest
132. This is not to imply that West Germany is nirvana for all the released prisoners.
The problems of adjustment to capitalist society have nudged a disproportionately large
number (but still a minority) of the freed East Germans into alcoholism or political extremism. See Raguse, supra note 3, at 588-90, Bayernkurier (Munich), May 26, 1979, at 28, col. 1.
133. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 1,para. 1;id., art. 2, para. 3.
134. Quoted in M. MEYER, supra note 5, at 215. [Translation by author.]
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upon and buttress a variety of East German human rights violations, particularly the persistent violation of the right to emigrate.
Although not universally accepted,1 35 the right to emigrate is one to
which the GDR repeatedly subscribes in international fora, only to
deny in both rhetoric and deed at home. The GDR's insistence
upon an auto-interpretation136 of its binding commitments in this
37
area has justifiably won it censure in the writings of publicists
and before the United Nations Humanf Rights Commission. 138 The
inseparable entanglement of the intra-German deals in the underlying strata of human rights violations is easily illustrated. If the
GDR either tolerated political dissent or opened its borders, the
GDR's reservoir of political prisoners within the GDR would probably swiftly dry up or drain away into the West. Additionally, the
market for East German prisoners would for the most part vanish,
provided the Bonn Government were wise enough not to pay for
exits which could have been or would eventually be cost-free. It is
obvious that if the GDR fully respected its commitments under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, a systematic
traffic in political prisoners could not exist.
Through the export of dissidents, the satisfaction of consumer
demands, and so on, the intra-German deals perpetuate human
rights violations by relieving domestic and international pressure
for alterations in the GDR's notoriously repressive security system.
The deals also help to offset the costs of administering the system,
both in terms of bringing the GDR coveted Western articles at no
monetary cost and in terms of saving the state otherwise unavoidat3 9
ble prison expenditures.
A battery of arguments can be employed to defend the GDR's
impugned practices. Five of the most common of them are summarized here. Appended to each, for comparison's sake, is a clipped
135. See supra note 122.
136. On the auto-interpretation problem, see Gross, States as Organs of International
Law and the Problem ofAutoinlerpretation, in LAw AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD COMMU-

NITY 59-88 (G. Lipsky ed. 1953).
137. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 112, at 353; Mahnke, Die Prinz6pienerkldrung der
KSZE-Schlussakten und das Vtilkerrecht,supra note 130, at 121. But see Buchholz and Wieland, Der Fall Weinhold- eine Kete von Rechtsbrachen der BRD-Justiz, 1977 N.J. 22, at 26

(denying individuals have a right to emigrate).
138. E Germany Censured over Human Rights, The Times (London), Feb. 28, 1981, at 4,
col. 5.
139. See supra note 65.
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paragraph mentioning a possible deficiency or two in the pro-GDR
position.
1. Argument
The treatment by the GDR of its own citizens is a matter of
purely domestic concern. Criticism of the GDR's internal politimpermissable foreign interference in
ical controls constitutes
40
affairs.
German
East
H.C. Ivo Lapenna made short work of this type of argument, however, when he wrote:
Such impossible claims hardly deserve any comments. They are
contrary to the universal character of human rights, to the duty
of the United Nations to promote the respect for these rights everywhere in the world, to the recognized close link between the
respect for human rights and the maintenance of peace, and to
the duty of states to observe them. These claims are also contrary to Principle VII which is an integral part of the (Helsinki)
Final Act and which entitles the signatories to promote jointly
and separately the universal and effective respect for human
rights. Of course, States are free to enter or not to enter into
treaty relations with other States. That is their sovereign right.
But if as sovereign States they decide to bound [sic] themselves
by a treaty in their common interest, then they necessarily restrict their full sovereignty in respect of the matter regulated by
the treaty. '41

2. Argument
"Bourgeois" human rights constructs are invalid under socialist
conditions. In the Marxist-Leninist state, the people, acting with
the guidance and through the Communist Party, define the genuine body of human rights. These rights guarantee the individual
participation in, and not protection from, the state. The people
need no metaphysically anchored safeguards because they rule
themselves. Provisions of international human rights agreements
42
at odds with state policy are therefore irrelevancies.'
140. See, e.g., Doernberg, Gflfeltrennenflfr den Frieden, 25 DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK
(No. 8) 5, 13 (1980). For a careful analysis of the intervention problem, see Beyerlin, Menschenrechie und Intervention. Analyse der west-tJstlichen Menschenrechtskonventionen Von
1977/78, in ZWISCHEN INTERVENTIONEN UND ZUSAMMENARBEIT 157, 173-88 (Simma &

Blenk-Knocke eds. 1979).
141. Lapenna, Legal Natureof the CSCEFinaIActandHuman Rights under International
and Soviet Law, 18 JAHRBucn FOR OSTRECHT 9, 17-18 (1977). See also Ebiasah, Protecting
the Rights of PoliticalDetaihiees: The Contradictions andParadoxes in the African Experience,
22 How. L. J. 249, 266-69 (1979).
142. Classic expositions of the GDR's position may be found in Poppe, he Basic Rights
of Socialist Man in the GDA, 6 GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 410-19 (1967); Poppe, The UN
Declaration of Hwnan Rights and the Constitution ofthe GDR, 7 GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
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Leaving aside any dispute over the truth of its factual claims, it
is sufficient to note that this argument is a prescription for international anarchy in treaty relations. The argument belies the very
nature of international agreements by denying them any authority
if they contradict state wishes.
3. Argument
The GDR's border and internal controls are security measures,
not unlike those enforced in every state as a standard aspect of
sovereign self-preservation. The GDR's "front-line" position reprecautionary measures to
quires the state to take some 4special
3
preserve international peace. 1
Obviously, the denuded death strips lining the GDR's borders
to the West are anything but routine. Even if a group of socialist
states impose security controls similar to those of the GDR, no satisfactory justification of a derogation from an express treaty obligation is achieved by a showing that a state is not alone in its
derogation.
4. Argument
(4) International human rights instruments are to be implemented gradually and as wholes. To condemn the GDR for not
complying with their every jot is: (1) to ignore present realities
which states have in mind when they make human rights agreements; (2) to rush a program designed to be absorbed into practice over a prolonged period; and, (3) to turn a blind eye to
Western shortcomings in the human rights field, particularly fail203-10 (1968); Poppe, Die Bedeutung der Grundrechte und Grundpflichzen des Bargers in der
sozialistischen Gesellschaft, 1978 N.J. 326-28. For richly annotated Western discussions of
the GDR's rejection of natural right, see Blumenwitz, Selbstbestimmung undMenschenrechte
in geteilten Deutschland, 17 JAHRBUCH F0R INTERNATIONALES RECHT 11, 30-33 (1974),
Mahnke, Die Prt'nzqienerklilrung der KSZE-Schlussakte unddas olkerrecht, supra note 129,
at 119-20.
143. On the putative normality of the GDR's measures, see Honecker, There is No Alternative to Peaceful Coexistence, in E. HONECKER, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC,
PILLAR OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM 76-77 (1979); 15. Juni 1961: Pressekonferenz des Staatsvorsitzenden Ulbricht, in DOKUMENTE ZUR DEUTSCHLANDPOLITIK, Series IV, Vol. 6, HalfVol. 2, 925, 931 (R. Salzmann ed. 1975). On their legality as measures of self-defense, see
Felber, The Protection ofthe GDR State Frontierin the Light oInternationalLaw, 5 GERMAN
FOREIGN POLICY 107-23 (1962); Mtfhlberger, Grenzverletzer werden streng zur Verantwortung
gezogen, 7 DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK 1274, 1275 (1962); Schirmer, Vdlkerrecht statzt
Schutzmassnahmen der DDR, id., 1280, 1281-83; Kohl and Krusche, VdIkerrechtliche
Gedanken zu den Schutzmassnahmen der Deutschen DemokratischenRepublik am 13.August
1961, 6 DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLrrIK 1147-54 (1961). See generally, Palenberg, supra note 7,
at 99-108.
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ure to secure economic rights and arms limitation.'4
The developments of the past five years reveal an East German tendency toward the tightening of state controls on individual
movement and political expression in the GDR. 4 5 Evidence of a
serious intent in the minds of the GDR's leadership to honor a general right to emigrate is lacking. With.regard to the GDR's complaints about Western inertia, one need only note that little
progress can be made if the GDR insists that other states substantially fulfill their human rights pledges as a condition precedent to
action on its own part. In any event, two state wrongs do not
amount to respect for human right.
5. Argument
"Escape clauses" in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,' and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,' 4 7 and other human rights documents1 48 permit East
144. "Our aim is, therefore, step by step to implement the whole of the [Helsinki] Final
Act which, in actual fact, is a programme for a prolonged period ahead. In so doing, we will
take a stand against any delays or attempts to treat parts of the document separately. The
Helsinki Final Act is an organic whole and the GDR wants to see implemented as such."
WHAT Is LIFE LIKE IN THE GDR? 56 (Panorama DDR, 1977). [Emphasis added.] See also
Doernberg, supra note 140, at 13; Hanisch, SchluBakte Yon Helsinki - langfristiges
Programm zur Festigung des Friedens, der Sicherheit und der Zusammenarbeit in Europa, 24
DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK (No. 7) 90-94 (1979); FREEDOM AND DanocR cy: FOR WHOM
AND FOR WHAT? 38-40 (Panorama DDR, 1977).
145. See supra note 23.
146. Article 29, Paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration, supra note 116, provides:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society.
147. Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
125, states in part:
Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except
those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security,
public order (ordrepublic), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms
of others, and are consistent with the rights recognized in the present
Covenant.
Similar qualifications are incorporated in Articles 18 (freedom of religion); 19 (freedom of
opinion and expression), 21 (freedom of assembly), and 22 (freedom of association). See also
Article 4 (permitting derogations from the Covenant in times of public emergency).
148. See generally Frowein, The Interrelationship Between the Helsinki Final Act, the International Covenants on Human Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights, in
HUMAN RrHTs, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE HELSINKI AccoRD 71, 74-77 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977). For passing considerations of some of the thornier aspects of escape clauses
in human rights agreements in general, see Green, Derogation of Human Rights in Emergency
Situations, 16 CANADIAN Y.B. INiL L. 92-115 (1978); Hartman, Derogation from Human
Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies, 22 HARv. INT'L L. J. 1-52 (1981).
(2)
(3)
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German lawmakers to abridge many absolute guarantees of right
if necessary for the protection of key state interests, such as
"public health or morals," "the general welfare in a democratic
society," "public order," or "national security." The GDR's security measures fit neatly within the parameters of these clauses.
The measures shield the state from foreign
subversion and from
49
a ruinous "brain drain" to the West. 1
Paranoiac rulers may perceive a threat to public order in almost any dissident activity. Any emigration, for example, could
easily be viewed as a threat to public order because of the loss of
manpower and the effect on the state's image which it might entail. 5 ° If the political rights shielded by international human rights
agreements are to have any content, their ordre public escape
clauses must be read narrowly. The GDR's interpretive tack is untenable because it transforms an escape clause, clearly intended as
an exception, into a general rule, thus, in effect, nullifying the grant
of the right itself. 5 '
Second, the intra-German arrangements arguably offend fundamental concepts of decency. Through their tribunals and actuaies, states routinely attach monetary values to the life and liberty
of their citizens (for example, by awarding judgments in wrongful
death actions). Similarly, private businessmen of many stripes
must calculate in among the costs of their undertakings the cost of a
few worker's lives. For eminently practical reasons, in circumstances such as these, "priceless" human life is tagged with a cold
cash value. While perhaps initially unsettling to the sentimental or
naive, such practices are not ordinarily deemed odious or suspect.' 5 2 In the case of the intra-German prisoner ransom deals,
however, there is legitimate ground for unease, for they institute on
the soil of modern Germany a brokerage in human flesh. By the
operation of the deals, thousands of human beings are systematically placed on the trading block each year, their destinies determined by Bonn's willingness to ante up funds for their purchase.
149. See note 143, supra. See also FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY: FOR WHOM AND FOR

WHAT? 38-40 (Panorama DDR, 1977).
150. See, Comment, Aliyah ofSoviet Jews. Protection ofthe Right ofEmigration under
International Law, 14 HARv. INT'L L. J. 89, 100-01 (1973).

151. Frowein, supra note 148, at 74-75; Mampel, supra note 18, at 152-53.
152. Where a manufacturer appears particularly callous, however, public indignation
may be stirred. See the report on the Ford Pinto product liability controversy in N.Y. Times,
June 10, 1979, at 76, col. 1.
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The method by which persons are shipped to the West bears earmarks of the old-time slave trade: a bargain is struck, individuals
are herded from confinement onto transports and carried into an
alien world, in most cases never to see their families and friends
again. Of course, the willing attitude of the modem "victims" and
their subsequent liberty distinguish the two situations, but the imperfect analogy offers itself nonetheless. Arguably inherent in the
modem deals is the temporary reduction of man to chattel-like status, to the place of a common article of commerce. And in this
respect, it can be argued that the deals denigrate the human dignity
of the persons dealt.' 5 3 The deals may thus well be morally, if not
legally, contemnable.
IV.

AN INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION? AN ALEXANDRIAN

STROKE?
Perhaps the standards of international public morality have
evolved to a point where state traffic in human beings should be
placed on a par with private trafficking and be prohibited by international agreement. Certainly if more states follow the lead of the
Iranian Government in trading hostages for economic concessions
from foreign states, a ban of this nature will take on a new lustre in
the eyes of many.
The most accurately targeted prohibition would ban the offering of individuals in trade for anything other than other individuals.
A formulation along these lines would avoid branding as culpable
the understandable rush of a state to rescue persons trapped in
what it perceives as unjust or inhumane foreign captivity. It would
also permit person-for-person exchanges. Even though such exchanges can provide opportunities for international extortion, they
should be spared for their redeeming features, notably: (1) they
confer obvious humanitarian benefits even-handedly; (2) they
avoid the opprobrious "pricing of souls" and payment of "blood
money;" and, (3) they are unlikely to develop into a full-blown ongoing business, for they provide no state with a chance to plunder
another state's treasury.
153. But cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (involving the "trading" of professional
athletes in the United States); Comment, Player Control Mechanisms in Professional Team
Sports, 34 U. Prrr. L. REv. 645-70 (1973) (describing the "ownership" of players by clubs).
West German journalist Peter Jochen Winters suggested that the payment of annual lump
sums by West Germany and the release of prisoners on a non-specific basis might cleanse the
transactions of their barter block unsavoriness. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 1,
1979, at 10, col. 2.
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Were a prohibition of this kind widely accepted, it would bring
the weight of international law against the unsavory merchandising
of persons, and, in the process, help remove a temptation which can
lead states to violate related and well-recognized human rights. An
obvious incentive to states to treat individuals shabbily would be
expressly disavowed by the international community. In Germany,
such a prohibition would put pressure on both the GDR and the
FRG to come to grips with the realities (and inconsistencies) underlying their exchange policies. As new members of the United Nations community, the GDR and the FRG are particularly sensitive
to influences upon their international standing.
A powerful disadvantage of an effective prohibition along the
lines suggested here would be that individuals trapped in East German prisons would see one of their best hopes for an early release
and a swift move to the West extinguished. For them, abstract
hopes for long-term societal gains as a result of a total prohibition
would offer cold comfort indeed. An additional disadvantage, to
name but one, would be that a familiar avenue for East-West consultation and cooperation - a tie binding the interests of both German governments - would necessarily disappear. An attempt to
resolve the conflicting tensions which the serious promotion of a
convention of this type would raise is beyond the ambition of this
Article.
V.

CONCLUSION

In framing attacks upon the intra-German political prisoner
exchange arrangements, commentators have been often injudicious
in their applications of terminology with legal content. The deals
involve neither "slave-trading" nor some kind of ultra vires state
kidnapping or hostage-taking. In fact, the deals as such apparently
fit nowhere within the schemes or under the rubrics of practices
hitherto forbidden by international law.
Still, the critics' instincts have not entirely misguided them. At
least some features of the deals seem to involve a departure from
the spirit, if not the letter, of the international law of human rights.
In so fluid and controversial an area of the law, literalism cannot be
the only measure of right. Perhaps the intra-German trades are so
tainted by the matrix of shadowy and probably illegal practices
from which they emerge that although they may themselves escape
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denunciation, when considered in isolation from their environment,
they should nonetheless be decried.
Unfortunately, a consequential criticism of the deals would
probably accomplish no more than their termination, an achievement of dubious merit when one considers their praiseworthy, humanitarian aspects as well as their flaws. The GDR's systematic
infringement of human rights would undoubtedly persist. The nature of the dilemma faced by the GDR's leaders was described by
one astute statesman centuries ago:
(A) prince "cannot possibly exercise all those virtues for which
men are called "good." To preserve the state, he often has to do
things against his word, against charity, against humanity,
against religion.
N. Machiavelli, I1Princqpe,
XVIII (1532)
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